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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
Since the early 1930s, the federal government has been providing 
disaster assistance programs to farmers. Examples of these are the 
Federal All-Risk Crop Insurance (FCI) program, the Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) low yield disaster 
assistance program, and the Farmer Home Administration Emergency Loan 
program. More recently, there has been a tendency to concentrate 
government efforts on a less costly and self-sustaining federal 
disaster assistance program. In fact, this trend began with the 
passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. As a consequence, 
the ASCS low yield assistance program is now virtually banned and 
emergency loans have been reduced. 
If the expanded FCI program is to be cost effective , James Deal, 
former Director of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, estimates 
that 68 percent of eligible acres should be insured. However, past 
experience has shown that only 14 percent of eligible acres have 
been insured steadily; in fact, with few exceptions, farmers 
have been unwilling to participate in all-risk crop insurance pro-
grams . 
Crop insurance is relevant when yield risks are the primary source 
of fluctuations in income. A well-designed insurance program would 
spread risks among many farmers, across diverse regions, across sectors 
of lthe economy, and over time. Like other risk-sharing arrangements, 
it enables the individual farmer to focus more aggressively on average 
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profits, thereby mitigating many of the effects of risk. It may also 
provide a more efficient alternative to traditional risk- shari ng 
arrangements such as sharecropping. 
Yet, there are two major deficiencies associated with crop insurance 
programs. First, they usually cover only yield variation and not price 
variation, so their contribution to income stability could be quite 
limited. Second, farmers may be less conscientious in trying to avoid 
damage from natural causes, because it is easy to rely on insurance com-
pensation. 
Crop and price risks play an important role in determining the 
well-being of farmers and their productivity. For these reasons, 
farmers look for ways to manage their resources efficiently in a 
risky environment . 
Price risk occurs because crop prices are not set by the farmer 
but are set by supply and demand in the commodity markets- -although 
price fluctuations may be limited by government intervention. Hence, 
the product price at harvest time may not equal the price the 
farmer expected months earlier when he made his planting decisions. 
The crop production risk is that of a reduced yie ld or crop failure 
caused by natural hazards of two kinds: (1) adverse weather--hail, 
wind, frost, drought, excessive moisture or flooding, and "late spring" , 
and (2) pests--insects, plant diseases, and weeds . 1 
The next section briefly discusses the nature of crop production 
1 
"Late spring" refers to cool weather and other conditions that 
interfere with germination and emergence of seedling plants. 
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hazards, the beginnings and evolution of crop insurance, the extent of 
present participation and the characteristics of current crop insurance 
contracts--i.e . crop, hail, and all-risk types. 
With the information required from the description of crop in-
surance, the next step is to establish hypotheses on farmers' atti-
tudes toward all- risk crop insurance. Objectives and methodology of 
the study are given in the same section. 
General Considerations 
The nature of crop production hazards 
Hail may damage a growing crop at any time up to harvest . Hail 
storms occur across much of the United States, with the chief hail 
insurance areas extending from central Montana to Virginia and North 
Carolina, reaching south to Kansas, Missouri, southern Illinois, and 
Kentucky. The hazard of drought is greatest in the Grain Plains where 
wheat, barley, and grain sorghum are the main insured crops and in the 
western Corn Belt where those crops as well as corn and soybeans are 
insured . Frost is a hazard to wheat and barley in the northern part 
of Montana, North Dakota and Minnesota and to corn and soybeans 
throughout the Corn Belt. Excess moisture and flooding are hazards 
to all crops in all areas. Unfavorable weather seasons may affect 
seed germination or seedling emergence and hence lower the eventual 
yield, particularly of crops like corn and cotton. 
Although man has little control over the weather, the risk of crop 
losses due to drought has been lessened. We now have varieties of 
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crops that are more resistant to droughts. And through the use of 
summer fallow, conservation tillage, and more timely operations, we are 
able to conserve more soil moisture for the use of crops. The use of 
the fallow has been greatly encouraged by the crop allotment and acre-
age diversion programs. Nevertheless, drought remains a serious 
hazard annually in the Great Plains and seasonally (late suunner) in the 
more humid East and South. 
Evolution of crop insurance 
The present description concentrates on the two principal kinds 
of crop insurance--crop-hail and all-risk. Crop-hail insurance is sold 
chiefly by private insurance companies, whereas all-risk crop insurance 
is sold chiefly by the federal crop insurance corporation . 
Crop-hail insurance1 Crop insurance was first used to protect 
against losses due to hail damage and is still widely used for that 
purpose. In 1880, tobacco growers in Connecticut organized a mutual 
hail insurance company that continued in business for seven years. 
In 1883, some fire insurance stock companies first offered hail in-
surance to crop farmers . These early attempts at offering crop in-
surance were sporadic and short-lived. Little was known about the 
frequency or the severity of hail damage within an area. By 1919, of 
the 121 mutual hail insurance companies that had operated at one time 
1 The historical development of crop-hail insurance is taken from 
Valgren (1922, pp. 2-11) . 
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or another, 80 had been discontinued. 
During the 1915-20 period, crop insurance received new impetus 
with the organization of several new companies. In addition to 43 
stock companies and several mutual companies then in business, the 
state legislatures of Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota established State crop-hail insurance systems. In 1919, the 
total volume of crop-hail insurance reached $559 million. Of this, 
the stock companies held almost half, and the remainder was about 
equally divided between the mutual companies and the State crop-hail 
insurance systems. During the 1920s, the amount of crop-hail insurance 
used by farmers declined and by 1934, it totaled only $87 million. 
Since the mid-1930s, crop-hail insurance has expanded rapidly, mainly 
via the commercial mutual and commercial stock companies, as all of 
the State-sponsored crop-hail insurance systems except Montana's have 
been discontinued. 
Crop-hail is generally available in all areas of the country where 
hail risk is significant. It is widely used on tobacco in the mid-
Eastern states, on corn and soybeans in the Corn Belt, and on wheat, 
barley, and grain sorghum in the Great Plains. In 1982, crop-hail in-
surance with coverage estimated at $8.9 billion was bought by $362.9 
million premium income. Total indemnities ($190.4 million) averaged 
52 percent of premium income (CHIAA, 1982). 
All-risk crop insurance Although commercial insurance com-
panies have become firmly established in the crop-hail insurance 
business, they have not yet developed a significant program of all-risk 
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or weather- peril insurance, mainly because of large losses incurred 
because of drought. The first recorded attempt (and failure) to 
of fer all- risk insurance was that of a company organized in 1899 to 
sell weather-peril insurance in North Dakota and Minnesota. Almost 
two decades later in 1917, three companies attempted to offer all-
risk insurance in the Dakotas and Montana, but they soon discontinued 
the operation. Again in 1920, several larger insurance companies 
attempted to insure grains and cotton, but without success. During 
the 1920s and 1930s, only a few attempts were made by commercial com-
panies to offer all-risk crop insurance, and all were soon discon-
tinued. 
These attempts by pioneer insurance companies failed for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) there was no proper actuarial calculation of risk 
because of inadequate data; (2) premium rates were too low compared 
to the coverage offered; (3) risks were not well-spread because of 
limited area of operation; and (4) applications were accepted when 
high probability of c rop failure existed (Ray, 1981). 
Federal crop insurance Because of these unhappy results 
by private crop insurance companies and an extended drought in the 
' 
Great Plains, President Roosevelt appointed a "President's Committee 
on Crop Insurance" in 1936 . After mee tings with government officials, 
the commercial insurance industry, and various farm groups, the Presi-
dent's Committee r ecommende d a plan for crop insurance to Congress in 
1937. After a year of legislative activity and hearings , Congress 
passed the Federal Crop Insurance Act in 1938 as Title V of the 
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Agricultural Adjustment Ac t. 
The original Act provided only for ins urance on wheat, beginning 
with the 1939 crop; insurance on cotton began in 1942. Both were 
very large programs in which the insurance was offered nationwide. 
Losses exceeded premiums on both wheat and cotton in each of the 
first five years, 1939-43 (Table I.l) . Although heavy losses re-
sulted directly from droughts, winterkill, and other causes, there 
were also some defects in the insurance plan and administrative 
operations. Because of the disappointing experience of the early 
years, Congress passed legislation withdrawing the insurance in the 
1944 crop year. 
The crop insurance program was revived by Congress in 1945 with 
insurance on wheat, cotton, and flax to be made available generally. 
Experimental work also was started on corn and tobacco insurance in 
a f ew counties. Experience improved with wheat and was satisfactory 
with flax, corn, and tobacco. However, large program losses occurred 
on cotton in both 1945 and 1946, primarily because of widespread 
drought in the Southwest. In 1946, total indemnities for all crops 
exceeded premiums by $28 million--a loss ratio of 1.80 (Table I.l). 
More than 75 percent of FCIC's original capital stock of $100 mil-
lion had been used to pay losses not covered by premiums in that 
year. 
As a result of the heavy losses in 1946, federal crop insurance was 
limited to an experimental basis in 1948, and the corporation was 
directed to develop a sollllder basis for its all-risk insurance. In 1948, 
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Table 1.1. Summar y of Federal Crop Insurance Corporation experience 
1939-1980a 
Liability Premiums Indemnities Pre- Ind em- Loss Year miums nities ratio 
-------thousands of dollars-------- As % of liability 
1939 $ 34,475 $ 3,411 $ 5,603 9 . 9 16 . 3 1.64 
1940 67,029 9,155 13,869 13.7 20 . 7 1.51 
1941 101,700 11, 2 79 18,924 11.1 18.6 1.68 
1942 197 , 613 16,694 24,937 8.4 12 . 6 1.49 
1943 244,394 18,236 33 , 231 7.5 13.6 1. 82 
1944 (No insurance offered) 
1945 148,161 9, 360 23,246 6 . 3 15.7 2 . 48 
1946 350,623 35,329 63,489 10.1 18.1 1.80 
1947 420, 921 43, 777 35,244 10.4 8 .4 . 81 
1947 & 
prior 1,564,916 147,241 218,543 9.4 14 . 0 1.48 
1948 153,997 12 ,684 6,780 8.2 4 . 4 .53 
1949 163,495 11,862 15,531 7.3 9.5 1. 31 
1950 240,448 14,104 12,799 5 . 9 5 . 3 . 91 
1951 317,463 19,111 21,338 6.0 6 . 7 1.12 
1952 350,216 21,200 20,609 6.1 5.9 .97 
1953 437 ,514 27,098 31,057 6.2 7.1 1.15 
1954 354,279 22,655 28,030 6.4 7.9 1.24 
1955 309,924 22,330 25,505 7.2 8.2 1.14 
1956 306, 743 22,139 27,890 7.2 9 . 1 1. 26 
1957 242,200 17 , 407 12,004 7.2 5.0 . 69 
1958 242, 712 17,617 4 , 505 7 . 3 1. 9 . 26 
1959 270,828 18,461 14 , 138 6.8 5 . 2 . 77 
1960 265,885 17,797 10, 316 6.7 3. 9 .58 
1961 271, 709 18,149 16,092 6.7 5.9 . 89 
1962 356,354 21,854 24,022 6.1 6.7 1.10 
1963 496,669 30,374 23,524 6.1 4.7 . 77 
1964 542,117 33,852 30,362 6.2 5 . 6 .90 
1965 590,393 36,015 40,753 6 . 1 6 . 9 1.13 
1966 635 , 523 36, 828 25,198 5.8 4 . 0 . 68 
1967 773,010 43 ,485 55,112 5.6 7.1 1.27 
1968 875,054 48,966 51,280 5.6 5 . 9 1.05 
1969 918,520 48,816 52,780 5.3 5 . 7 1.08 
1970 852 , 086 44,387 41,850 5 . 2 4 . 9 . 94 
1971 946 , 005 47,878 28,553 5 . 1 3.0 . 60 
aSource: Feder al Crop Insurance Corporation, Annual Report to 
the Congress, 1980 . 
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Table 1.1. (Continued) 
Year Liability Premiums 
Pre-
Indemnities 
miums 
Ind em- Loss 
nities ratio 
---------thousands of dollars-------- As% of liability 
1972 $ 854. 971 $ 42,063 $ 25,266 4.9 3.0 .60 
1973 1,007,412 47,537 28,305 4.7 2.8 . 60 
1974 1,148,812 53, 984 63,336 4.7 5.5 1.17 
1975 1,570,493 73.377 63,385 4.7 4.0 • 86 
1976 2,082,486 90,838 1'•2, 328 '•. 4 6 . 8 1.57 
1977 2,205,628 101, 776 149,011 4.6 6.8 1.46 
1978 2,094,120 93,860 47,367 4.5 2.3 .50 
1979 2,224,718 103,347 67,205 4.6 3.0 . 65 
1980 3,040,197 157,553 347,130 5.2 11.4 2.20 
1948- 80 ~27 1 1411981 ~1 1 4191404 ~115531361 5.2 5 . 7 1.09 
insurance was authorized in only 200 wheat counties, 56 cotton counties, 
and a smaller number of counties for other crops. Previously , insurance 
had been available in about 2,500 counties. 
Between 1948 and 1980, insurance protection under FCI increased 
from $154 to $3,040 million (Table 1.1). The number of crops eligible 
for insurance expanded to 28, and the number of counties in which 
insurance was available increased from 324 to 1928. 
The loss experience of FCIC was better for the 1948- 80 period than 
in years prior to 1948. Indemnities paid out during 1948-80 were equal 
to 1 . 09 percent of the premiums paid in by farmers (Table I.l). 
With a combination of losses and successes, the insurance program 
was restructured by the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. Crop 
insurance is now offered to nearly all of the 3,000 agricultural 
counties in the U.S . , covering 30 crops with 15,321 county programs. 
The new program moves toward a crop insurance based on a farmer's 
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actual production and loss fig ures . The program permits farmers to 
purchase hail and fire coverage f rom private companies and r eceive a 
premium reduction from the "all-risk" federal policy . It also author-
izes the federal payment of the first 30 percent of a farmer's premium 
for coverage up to and including 65 percent of t he average yield, and 
enables the private insurance industry through licensed agents and 
brokers to offer federal c rop insurance, all in an effort t o expand 
the sources from which farmers can obtain insurance. 1 Another objec-
tive of the new program is to become the primary form of federal 
disaster protection for farmers. 
Extent and area of participation in 
crop insurance 
Commercial crop-hail insurance Ins urance against crop-hail 
damage to growing crops is available and is used in all a r eas of the 
country where the risk is significant. Participation in crop-hail 
insurance depends not only upon the incidence of hails torms bu t also 
upon the va lue of the crop grown and its susceptibility to hail damage . 
I n years of drought, for example, growers f eel less need for hail 
pr otection. 
About two-thirds of the crop-hail insurance coverage is sold in 
seven s t ates--four in the Corn Belt plus Minnesota, Kansas, and North 
Dakota . Cropwise, wheat, corn grain, soybeans, cotton, and t obacco 
1 
Details of these changes are given in " Charac teristics of Crop 
Ins urance ." 
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account for about 85% of the crop-hail insurance sold in 1982 (Table 
I. 2). 
Federal crop insurance In 1982, about 60% of all eligible acre-
age for federal crop insurance was located in nine states, where only 
15.8% of the acres were insured. Illinois and Indiana accounted for 
the lowest participation rates, with Nebraska the highest among the nine 
leading states. Similarly, only 18.2 of the eligible acres in other 
states were insured (Table I.3). 
Five crops--wheat, corn, soybeans, cotton, and tobacco--accounted 
for about 80% of the total eligible acreage in 1982. Only 20% of such 
acres were insured. Overall, 16.8% of the total eligible acreage in 
the United States was insured in 1982 (Table I.3). In the last decade, 
participation has been at a fairly constant rate of 14% per year. It 
seems that even with the improved 1980s FCI program, the participation 
rate has not significantly improved. 
Characteristics of the two main types of 
crop insurance 
Conunercial crop-hail insurance Conunercial crop-hail insurance 
protects against crop loss due to hail or combination of hail and 
wind; some policies also cover crop loss due to fire. Insurance cover-
age is offered in dollar amounts per acre up to the reasonable value 
of a full yield, with the premium scaled accordingly. 
The premium charge per acre is based not only on the amount of 
insurance coverage per acre, but also on the probability of occurrence 
12a 
Tahle I.2. Crop-hail insurance: CovC'rage, premiums, Lndem11ities, 
and loss ratio in leading states and crops, 1982 (CHIAA, 
United States Statistics, 1982)a 
States 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
Seven states 
Other states 
By crop: 
Wheat 
Corn grain 
Soybeans 
Cotton 
Tobacco 
Five crops 
Other crops 
United States 
Insurance 
coverage 
(000) 
1,699,513 
470,133 
1,143,615 
450,833 
601,551 
501,070 
650,914 
5,517,629 
3,425,960 
1,869,890 
2,993,497 
1,732,404 
455,352 
667,544 
7,718,687 
1,224,902 
8,943,589 
Premiums 
(000) 
26,078 
6,874 
42,438 
28,380 
37,603 
34,583 
42,418 
218,374 
144,572 
96,186 
72' 899 
82,901 
19, 724 
35,540 
306,800 
56,146 
362,946 
Indemnities 
(000) 
4,940 
1,477 
6,653 
20,201 
7,324 
18,841 
20,426 
79,862 
100,510 
66,565 
21,267 
20,246 
31,080 
15,829 
154,987 
35,385 
190,372 
Loss 
ratio 
percent 
19 
21 
16 
71 
19 
54 
48 
36 
76 
69 
29 
24 
162 
44 
50 
63 
52 
a 
About 90 percent of all crop-hail insurance contracts are written 
with CHIAA members and subscribers. 
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Table I.3. Percentage of eligible acreage insured by the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (1982) 
States 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Nine states 
Other states 
By crop: 
Wheat 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Cotton 
Tobacco 
Five crops 
Other crops 
United States 
Eligible 
acreage 
(000) 
20,630 
11,118 
22,314 
17,699 
18,949 
13,454 
19,409 
11, 313 
18,405 
153,295 
110' 892 
62,583 
74,918 
61,438 
11,821 
966 
211, 728 
52,459 
264 ,188 
Percentage 
insured 
(percent) 
4.6 
5.8 
17.3 
15.5 
15.7 
19.4 
35. 4 
13.7 
10.9 
15.8 
18.2 
24 .7 
19.3 
16.5 
9.6 
41.3 
19.6 
8 . 0 
16.8 
13 
of hail, and the probable degree of damage-- factors which in corn-
bination indicate the probable indemnities. In addition to cover-
ing the probable indemnities , premiums are set to cover operating 
cos ts and to return a profit. Actuarial data are mainly statistics 
on hail-loss adjustments pooled from the experience of insurance com-
panies. 
The indemnity is based on the percentage of the crop damaged by 
hail. Damage is measured in terms of stand reduction of percentage of 
grain heads or corn ears lost, and so on . The damage is assessed by 
the insurance company soon after the event, so it can be isolated from 
other causes. The indemnity is computed as the percentage of damage 
times the insured value (per acre damaged). For example, assume a 
farmer insures an acre of corn for a total value of $360 . Also assume, 
he experienced a damage evaluated as 10 percent below potential yield . 
Without deductible, he expects to r eceive indemnities equal to $36 
(360 x .10 = 36). 
1 
Federal all-risk crop insurance The purpose of federal all-
risk crop insurance (FCI) is "to promote the national welfare by 
improving the economic stability of agriculture through a sound system 
f . .. 2 o crop insurance • • • • The purpose i s simply to enable farmers 
to recover their production expenses (their investment in the crop) 
rather than compensate them for the full value of the crop. Hence, 
1
Appendix A contains a more detailed description of federal all-
risk crop insurance features. 
2 
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. (1980), p. 1. 
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FCI coverage is limited by the usual expense of crop production, not 
to exceed 75 percent of the county (or area) average normal yield. 
Owner-operators, tenants, renters, crop-share landlords, partner-
ships, corporations, and states can insure their share of an insurable 
crop that is produced on insurable land. Since the Crop Insurance Act 
of 1980, FCI is now available through private insurance companies 
which in turn have reinsurance agreements with the FCIC. Reinsurance 
private companies write multiple peril crop insurance policies con-
taining the same terms, rates, and coverages as FCI. 
The insured select a yield coverage among three percentages of 
yield protection (50, 65, or 75 percent). The percentage selected 
times the average yield in the area where the farm is located gives 
the crop yield guarantee per acre insured. The insured can also 
choose a price level among three price options established by the 
Corporation for each crop. This level is used to calculate premiums 
and possible indemnities. It is not the purpose of the price options 
to guarantee a minimum market price for the insured farmer's crop. 
Price options are established so that the insured can recover variable 
costs of the crop losses experienced. 
The premium charge per acre is based on the price option selected 
and on the probability of the yield falling below the yield guarantee. 
The premium is set to cover only the anticipated indemnities and to 
build up a reserve. In computing premiums, the operating expenses of 
the Corporation may not be included. The FCI premium of a farmer may 
be reduced after his policy has been in effect for two years and he 
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has filed no claims. The following schedule shows premium discounts 
earned by consecutive years (up to seven years) without a loss 
claim. 
Percent premium Consecutive year s 
rate reductions with no loss 
5% after 1 year 
5% after 2 years 
10% after 3 years 
10% after 4 years 
15% after 5 years 
20% after 6 years 
25% after 7 years and over 
The possibil ity of earning reduced premium rates discourages 
farmers from reporting inconsequential small losses. 
Indemnities are based upon the difference between the yield guaran-
tees and the harvested yield (if any) . For this purpose, the yield is 
averaged on all acres of the same insured crop on the farm . Thus, even 
though the crop on some acres might fail totally, there would be no 
indemnity if the average yield on all acres insur ed equals the yield 
guarantee per acre. 
The indemnity is computed at the price option originally selected 
by the purchaser. For some crops, the indemnity may be increased to 
compensate for cost of harvesting, but not in the case of total loss 
when there is no har vest. 
FCI must be purchased before a specified closing date , at seeding 
time or before . Cancellation must precede a specified date. A 
16 
reinstated policy is a new policy with respect to the premium rate dis-
count. 
Comparisons of crop-hail insurance and federal all-risk insurance 
Crop-hail insurance and federal all-risk insurance differ significantly 
in several ways: 
(1) Insurance coverage. Private crop-hail insurance can be bought 
with the yield and dollar coverage preferred by the user up to 
the full value of the expected crop. FCI coverage is limited to 
up to 75 percent of area yield (or farm proved yield if qualify-
ing); the user may have up to three unit price options with his 
guarantee. The crop-hail is flexible in that it can be readily 
used as supplemental coverage to other insurance such as FCI 
or to supplement other strategies used to combat risk. 
(2) Premium revenue. Private crop-hail expects premium revenue to 
pay indemnities, build reserves, pay operating costs, and return 
a profit. FCI expects premium revenue only to pay indemnities 
and to build reserves; the federal Government finances FCIC opera-
tion expenses. 
(3) Indemnities. Crop-hail indemnifies the farmer for that portion 
of his growing crop that is lost because of hail and fire. Loss 
adjustment is a matter of determining that percentage of the 
crop lost and is not concerned with the average yield as such. 
Indemnities are based on the loss percentage times the contracted 
insurance coverage. In contrast, FCI indemnifies for the amount 
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by which the actual yield falls below the insured or guaranteed 
yield. Adjustment is a matter of determining the actual yield , 
proof of which is the harvested yield. FCI computes indemnities 
on the average yield for the entire farm (acres insured) , whereas 
crop-hail computes and pays indemnities on individual acres 
damaged or destroyed . 
(4) Date of purchase. Crop-hail can be purchased at any time up to 
harvest whereas FCI must be purchased at or before crop planting 
time--as it must, since it insures against all risks . 
Study Considerations 
The general overview of crop insurance serves, along with the 
problem s tatement, to established hypotheses on the desirability of 
crop insurance from the farmer's standpoint and to establish objec-
tives and methodology of the research study . 
Hypotheses statements 
In addressing the problem of farmers ' low participation in all-
risk (multiperil) crop insurance , we have developed the following 
hypotheses : 
(1) Farmers reject multiperil crop insurance because of their 
perception of risk exposure, awareness of yield variability 
or attitudes toward production risk--particularly low proba-
bility disasters. 
(2) Farmers rej ect multiperil crop insurance because alternative 
risk management strategies make insurance unnecessary. 
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Possible competitors with insurance include government 
farm conunodity programs, marketing options, enterprise di-
versification, leverage, internal capital reserves, or farm 
size. 
(3) Farmers reject multiperil crop insurance because the premiums 
and/or protection (coverage) levels are not set correctly. 
This implies premiums may be too high; they do not provide a 
sufficient protection because of low yield guarantees. 
Perhaps premiums are not adjusted downward rapidly enough to 
reflect satisfactory loss experience. Alternatively, the 
premium structure may not be actuarially sound. 
These hypotheses attempt to capture the farmer's perception of 
production risk and his bearing-ability to cope with it, and the 
economic aspects of multiperil crop insurance working along with other 
risk-reducing strategies. 
Research objectives and methodology 
The objectives of the research study are directly related to the 
hypotheses on crop insurance participation. In brief, they are: 
(1) a review of most recent and relevant literature on farmers' 
awareness of risk and risk exposure. The review also in-
cludes relevant studies dealing with FCI as a risk management 
strategy. 
(2) a development of a crop insurance theoretical model of deci-
sion making under risk . Although the theoretical model is 
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a model directly related to production risk, price risk is 
also managed in the theoretical -model . 
(3) based upon the theoretical model, the final objective is 
to have an empirical estimate of the role and desirability 
of all-risk crop insurance in decisions under risk by develop-
i ng a farm firm level computer model which analyzes alterna-
tive risk-bearing strategies other than crop insurance. 
In regard to the last two objectives, the principal procedures in-
volved in meeting these objectives include establishing costs and net 
returns from a set of risk management strategies where crop insurance 
is compared against different leverage positions, farm sizes, farm 
programs, and marketing alternatives. The theoretical model (Chapter II) 
is developed within this framework of strategies which does not try to 
exhaust all possible ways that farmers may bear production and price 
risks, nor consider other sources of risk. 
A farm level computer version of the theoretical model is written 
to generate empirical evidence on the assertions of hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Crop yields and yield variability play an important role in crop insur-
ance relevance as a risk management tool. Good estimates of yield 
distributions are crucial. Basically, yield distributions can be 
elicited from farmers' beliefs (subjective approach) or from histori-
cal data (historical approach). The computer model and yield distribu-
tions are the main themes of Chapter III. 
Actual estimation and discussion of results are found in Chapter 
IV. Stochastic dominance procedures (Anderson et al., 1977) are used to 
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evaluate crop insurance and performances of alternative strategies. 
Stochastic dominance searches for an efficient set of strategies that 
are undominated and hence admissible. 
Finally, concluding comments are given in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Literature Review 
A conm1on point in the literature of insurance in general is the 
frequent use of expected utility models as a tool to measure decision 
makers ' preferences under risk . In regard to agricultural insurance 
decision analysis, the Expected Utility Hypothes i s (as developed by 
Von Neumann and Morgenste rn (1947)) has been, among the group of 
expected utility models, the most widely applied in the field. Given 
the f requent use of that utility model in crop insurance, a descrip-
tion of the model is first presented, followed by a review of the 
literature in insurance. 
Expected Utility Hypothesis 
Expected utility can be seen as a me thod useful to measure human 
responses to uncertain events. "Event" is defined as the situation 
an i ndividual is confronted with. "Human response" is defined as the 
decision demanded by the event . 
I n regard to the measurement of expected utility, Bernoulli 
was one of the pioneers who developed mathematical forms of the 
expected utility model . Be rnoulli's motivation was to explain the so-
called St. Petersburg Paradox. The Paradox asks "why people would 
pay only a small sum for a game of infinite mathematical expectation" 
(Schoemaker, 1980, p. 11). Bernoulli's answer was that people 
maximize the "moral expectation" of the event rather than its expected 
monetary value. Moreover, Bernoulli related the moral expectation (or 
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expected utility) to the concept of wealth (also expressed in utilities). 
In particular, Bernoulli suggested that the utility resulting from any 
small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate to the quantity 
of goods previously possessed. Thus, Bernoulli's concept led to a 
concave utility function which has important implications in the theory 
of risk aversion. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) restated Bernoulli's work in 
a new utility theory which expanded economic theory into models of risk. 
Today this theory predominates among models of choice under risk. 
Rational1 decision making under risk is contained in the theory,which 
assumes that no one would want to violate its axioms. On the other 
hand, the theory reaffirms the Bernoulli principle that people maximize 
expected utility rather than mathematical expectation. 
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern (NM) utility theory (hereafter referred 
to as the Expected Utility Hypothesis (EUH)) establishes that a rational 
individual (decision maker) is said to maximize his utility if he 
2 accepts the following postulates: 
(1) Complete ordering and transitivity: For any two alternatives, A1 
and A2 , a person either prefers A1 to A2 or A2 to A1 or is indif-
ferent between them. If a person is able to order alternatives, 
and let us say that the person prefers A1 to A2 and A2 to A3
, then 
the transivity concept tells that the person must prefer A
1 
to A
3
• 
1
rn a broad sense, rational means to act according to some ordering 
of alternatives. 
2 
For alternative set of postulates (P. C. Fishburn, 1970) • . 
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(2) Continuity: If A
1 
is preferred to A2 , and A2 to A3 , then some 
probability p (between 0 and 1) must exist so that the person 
is indifferent between A2 and a lottery offering A1 or A3 with 
probability p and (1 - p), respectively. 
(3) Independence: If a person is indifferent between A1 and A2 , then 
two lotteries offering A1 and A3 in the first lottery and A2 and 
A
3 
in the second, with probabilities p and (1 - p) in each lottery 
should be indifferent to him for any A3 and p value. 
(4) Unequal probability: If A1 is preferred to A2 , a lottery L1 con-
taining A
1 
and A2 is preferred to a lottery 1 2 containing the 
same outcomes A
1 
and A
2 
if, and only if, the probability of A
1 
is 
greater in L
1 
than in L
2
. 
(5) Complexity: If lottery L1 has L3 
and 1
4 
as outcomes, with L3 and 
1 4 offering only alternatives A1 and A2 , and if L2 offers A1 and 
A2 only, then a person should be indifferent between L1 and 1 2 if, 
and only if, the expected values of L
1 
and 1
2 
are identical. This 
postulate guarantees that the final probability p of A
1 
and (1 - p) 
of A2 are identical in either 11 or L2 . 
The above postulates are sufficient to prove that there exists a 
utility index, unique up to linear positive transformation, so that 
computing expected utilities will yield a preference ordering among 
alternatives or lotteries of alternatives. 1 
l 
In terms of the theoretical model to be developed, alternative 
will mean a risky prospect that has a probability distribution of 
outcomes . 
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The EU~ model proposes that decision makers maximize the expected 
utility of wealth plus income (or final asset position) from all possi-
ble choices. This is 
Maximize E[U(W)) (II.l) 
where E stands for the expectations operator evaluated over all possi-
ble action alternatives, U represents the utility function, and W the 
decision maker's wealth plus income. 
In the discrete case, U(W) is equal to lP i U(Wi) where pi is the 
probability associated with an alternative that brings a wealth plus 
income position equal to wi. 
Finally , expected utilities are based on the individual's subjec-
tive distribution of outcomes . Higher moments of utility, e.g., its 
variance, are not relevant in the selection process . Utility can be 
scaled arbitrarily since utility is defined up to linear transformation. 
However, comparison of utility values between individuals is meaning-
less (Anderson et al . , 1977). 
Thus in utility theory, one needs first to determine preferences 
of the decision maker in order to derive his utility function. Such a 
utility fllllction will reflect the decision maker's degrees of belief and 
his degrees of preference. Once a decision maker's utility function 
is derived, it is possible to lead him to the analysis, for example, 
of risk management strategies to cope with farm risks. 
This idea will be brought up again in the presentation of the 
theoretical model. Several studies have been conducted to test the 
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validity of the EUH's axioms, and some of the findings are discussed 
below. 
In regard to the ordering axiom. Mosteller and Nogee (1951) car-
ried out an experimental study with Harvard students and National Guards-
men as subjects. NM utility functions were constructed for each of the 
subjects. The major finding was that the estimated utility curves 
did respect the ordering rule of EUH . 
Another similar experimental study by Davidson et al . (1957) using 
19 Stanford business students had the following general conclusions : 
(1) people chose as if they attempted to maximize EU, (2) the utility 
functions were gener a l ly nonlinear, and (3) upon remeasurement, sub-
jects appeared consistent . 
Tversky (1969) showed that transitivity (considered in the ordering 
axiom) is likely to be violated when subjects use evaluation strategies 
involving comparisons within dimension, e . g. first comparing price, 
then quality, then size, etc. 
By asking a group of people to rank three gambles A, B, plus a 
probability mixture of A and B called C in order of attractiveness, 
Coombs (1975) found that subjects ranked these three gambles in three 
basic groups, namely "monotone orderings" (ACB or BCA), "folded order-
ings" (CAB or CBA), and inverted ordering (ABC or BAC) . Only the mono-
tone ranking is consistent with EU . From 520 rank orderings reviewed 
by Coombs, 54 percent were monotone, 27 percent were folded, and 19 
pe r cent inverted. This suggests that nearly half the subjects violated 
the continuity axiom. 
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Tversky (1972) discussed the independence axiom in terms of a 
certainty effect and a reference effect that are sources of error in 
judgments. When confronting an individual with a situation with a certain 
outcome (p=l) and probabilistic outcomes (i.e . A1 with p and A2 with 
(1-p), where O<p<l), the certain outcome is seen larger than those 
that are uncertain. On the other hand, the reference effect states 
that people evaluate options in relation to their status quo, adaption 
level or expectations rather than to final asset positions, as EU 
theory assumes. Preferences might change because of differences in the 
formulation of a decision problem. 
From the above review, it is apparent that the EUH's axioms 
are systematically violated by people in experimental studies. However, 
what seems also apparent is that the EUH (as developed by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern) only established the general rules a rational 
individual should always follow, and not rules for conducting experi-
mental studies. In spite of this, the validity of the EUH's axioms 
depends as much on a rational behavior as how well an experimental 
study is brought forth to cope with real situations. 
Alternatives to EUH A very complete classification of alterna-
tive methods is found in Schoemaker (1980, Chapter 3) . In general, he 
classifies decision models as holistic and non-holistic, or sequential 
elimination, models. The holistic branch contains expected utility 
theory, EU models with probability transformations, mean-risk models, 
and additive models. The non-holistic models include comparisons 
against some standard, comparisons across attributes, and comparisons 
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within attributes. 1 A brief discussion of the EU models with proba-
bility transformations follows. 
EU models with probability transformations are further divided 
into two groups: subjective expected utility mode ls and subjective 
weighted utility models. We will deal with each of them at this time. 
Subjective expected utility (SEU) proposes that probability P. 
]. 
of EUH be replaced by f(pi ), so that U(W) = Lf(p.) ·U(W.). In this 
]. ]. 
new expression, f(p.) is a mathematical probability symbol in which 
]. 
the sum of all pi equals 1 (i.e., Lf(pi) = 1). 
SEU models usually assume (1) independence between utility and 
subjective probability; (2) risk invariance of utility; and (3) the 
mathematical probability expression f f(p.) = 1. In this sense, proba-
l. 
bility is regarded as a degree of beliefs, and it may differ from "the 
stated or objective ones assumed by the researcher" (Schoemaker, 1982, 
p. 537). In a review of empirical studies by Lee (1971), it is found 
that subjective probability curves overestimate low probabilities and 
underestimate high probabilities. However, subjective probabilities 
are higher when the outcomes are more desirable. 
The subjective weighted utility (SWU) of transformed probability 
EU models differs from SEU models in that the mathematical probabilities 
1rn the holistic approach, each alternative (or choice), X, is 
assessed independently of the others and assigned a utility value, 
U(X) . Under the non-holistic approach, alternatives are usually com-
pared to each other under certain standards or attributes, but they 
are never evaluated just by their own worth. Thus , an optimal choice 
may be reached by making comparisons "vis-a-vis" other alternatives. 
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do not possess characteristics shown in SEU models (e.g., ff(p1) = 1). 
Three different approaches have recently been developed: certainty 
equivalence theory (Handa, 1977), subjectively weighted utility 
model (Karmarkar, 1978), and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). 
Randa (1977) developed a set of axioms for a certainty equivalent 
(CE) utility theory that differs from the traditional EUR theory. 
Handa states in his axioms that the outcomes and their respective proba-
bilities are the relevant element of an individual's preferences among 
outcomes. Thus, using his terminology, the utility function in CE 
theory is: 
(II.2) 
where now U(X) is linear; i.e., U(X
1
) = x
1 
with a mathematical proba-
bility equal to h(pi). The expression h(p.) exhibits overweighting 
i 
of low probabilities (risk seeking), and underweighting of high proba-
bilities (risk aversion) when plotting h(pi) in the vertical axis and 
p. in the horizontal axis (Randa, p. 113). However, in a comment on 
i 
Randa's paper, Fishburn (1978) demonstrates that CE theory reduces to 
the expected monetary value model, where h(pi) =pi' for sufficiently 
rich prospects, i.e. a set of three outcomes only. 
Karmarkar (1978) proposed a descriptive model that is an extension 
of the usual EUR model. It is the Subjective Weighted Utility (SWU) 
model, in which the only difference lies in how probabilities are ex-
pressed into the criterion. Normalized decision weights replace the 
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probabilities p . . Given a lottery t with its outcomes X. and proba-
1 1 
bilities p,, a SWU f unction can be written as: 
1 
n n 
SWU(t) = l W. U(X.) / l W. 
i~l 1 1 i=l 1 
where Wi is a weighted function of pi ' explicitly 
W{p) 
(II. 3) 
(II. 4) 
If a=l, then W{p) is linear and equal to p. For a> l, W(p) dist r i-
bution is S- shaped, which in turn, the understated low probabilities will 
show that a risk aversion position is taken. For a <l, low probabilities 
are overstated and high probabilities understated. Karmarkar empha-
sized that a weighting function "does not represent a probabili t y per-
ception phenomenon." Given a perceived probability p by the decision 
maker, " .. the transformation reflects a bias in the way the proba-
bility is incorporated into evaluating the associated lottery" 
(Karmarkar, 1979, p. 67). 
With hypothetical choice problems presented to students and uni-
vers ity faculty, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate that in the 
generalized idea of concave utility function (risk aversion), the 
maximization of final wealth (U(W + x
1
, p
1
, ... , W + Xn, pn) > U(W)) , 
and that U(X1 , p1 , ... , Xn' pn) = p1U(X1) + .. . + pnU(Xn), the overall 
utility of a prospect equal to the utility of its outcomes of the EUH 
are systematically violated by several phenomena. 
The phenomena found by Kahneman and Tversky are : 
(1) Certainty effect. People's preferences (or weights) of outcomes 
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usually differ from their respective probabilities (as is assumed 
in EUH model). Instead, people "overweight outcomes that are 
considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely proba-
ble •.• " (p. 265). This is the so-called certainty effect. 
(2) Reflection effect. Between prospects with only positive outcomes 
(i.e. Xi>O), people have a certain order of preferences. However, 
when a negative sign is placed in front of the outcomes of the 
same prospects, people's preferences are reversed (mirror-image 
effect) . This reflection effect implies that in the positive 
domain, people behave as risk averters while they behave as risk-
seekers in the negative domain (i.e. losses only). 
(3) Isolation effect. Frequently, people disregard components that 
are common between alternatives in order to simplify decision 
making. Instead, they focus on aspects that distinguish the 
alternatives. This effect can be the cause of inconsistent 
preferences since common and distinguishing aspects can be broken 
down in more than one way which may lead to different preferences. 
Given the above effects that violate the EUR model, Kahneman and 
Tversky developed an alternative descriptive model called "prospect 
theory . " The utility function of this theory is now composed of a 
value function v(Xi) and a weighting function n (pi), explicitly 
(II.5) 
when comparing two prospects with either x1>X2>0 or x1<x2<0 and if 
P1 +p2 = 1 (mathematical probabilities add to one). 
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(II . 6) 
where, now , n (O) = 0, n (l) = 1, and v(O) = 0 are linear and prospect 
theory is similar to expected monetary value ( \ p.X . ) in this special l i i 
case . However, I pi=l in the expe cted value model . 
Kahneman and Tversky, as does Karmarkar, emphasize that "decision 
we i ghts are not probabilities: they do not obey the probability axioms 
and they should not be interpreted as measures of degree or belief" 
(1979, p. 280). Finally , they state that n (p) >p for low probabilities 
and n (p) <p for high probabilities which impli es that for all O<p<l, 
n (p) + n(l-p) < l; thus, the weighting function is within the bounds 
of 0 and 1. 
In brief, the properties of the probability weighting function 
n (p) can be summarized as follows: 
(1) n (O) = 0 and n (l) = 1 . 
( 2) Subadditivity for small p (i.e., n (t p) >Tn (p) for O<T<l). 
(3) Overweighting of small p (i. e ., n (p) >p). 
(4) Subcertainty : n (p ) + n(l-p) <l for O<p <l . 
(5) Subproportionality : n (pq)/n (p) ~ n (pq t )/ n (pt ) for O <p,q, t~l . 
The main differences between the EUH and prospect theory can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Prospect theory defines a value function that is unique up to 
positive ratio transformations . EUR is unique up to linear 
transformations. The value func tion in prospect theory does not 
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measure attitudes toward risk, but only the value of outcomes 
under conditions of certainty. In general, it is convex for 
losses and concave for gains. 
(2) While objective probabilities are used in EUH, decision weights, 
n (pi) are used in prospect theory. n(pi) reflect the impact of 
outcomes on "the prospect's attractiveness." Low probabilities are 
generally overweighted and high ones underweighted . 
(3) Strictly positive or negative outcomes involved in prospects are 
treated separately from combinations of both in prospect theory . 
Such a distinction does not appear in EUH. 
(4) To simplify choices, prospect theory performs various editing 
operations such as coding, combining, segregation and cancella-
tion. 
(5) Finally, prospect theory's value function is a subjective measure 
of outcomes relative to some reference point that may vary as a 
function of problem presentation. Changes in wealth or assets 
are emphasized instead of final asset position (as in EUH). 
Insurance literature 
Since farm management strategies normally involve crop insurance 
as a risk reducing strategy, the review of literature is concentrated 
on crop insurance and the natural type of insurance disasters (i.e., 
flood) with a two-fold purpose: (1) to gain insight into a method to 
measure preferences in risky situations, and (2) to improve under-
standing of human behavior under risk. 
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Optimal insurance purchase was discussed by Mossin (1968). 
Assuming an initial wealth (or net worth), Mossin studied the problems 
an individual faces in the purchase of property insurance: maximum 
accep table premium for full coverage , optimal coverage at a given 
premium , optimal reinsurance quota, and optimal amount of deducti-
ble1 in less than full coverage. He solved for these problems in 
a theoretical model where risk avers ion is implicit since a premium 
exists . Mossin has demonstrated in his model that as wealth in-
creases, an individual's risk aversion decreases and , therefore, 
premiums must be a decreasing function of wealth. 
Using a model of rational insurance purchasing, Doherty (1975) 
establishes the basis of willingness to pay premiums given the indi-
vidual ' s level of risk (prone, neutral, or averter). Given an 
actuarially fair premium, a risk-seeking individual who shows a convex 
utility func tion will not buy insurance (or he will self-insure) as 
long as the mean of the insurance prospect is lower than that of the non-
insurance prospect . Under risk neutrality, the utility function is a 
straight line and the individual is indifferent between full insurance 
and self-insurance. The utility function is concave under risk aversion 
2 
and full insurance is preferred by the risk averter. 
1
A deductible is a fixed sum of deduction for each claim so that 
the insured himself bears losses below this s um. 
2
rhe degree of risk aversion is measured by the coefficient of 
risk aversion. An absolute coefficient of risk aversion is given by 
U"/U ' for each level of wealth (or any other criterion of analysis) . 
See Pratt (1964) . 
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Doherty also studied the Mossin and Smith theorem that less than 
full insurance is optimal where "proportional loading" is imposed. 
Proportional loading is a premium rating system where premiums are 
directly related to the size and probability of a loss and a coverage 
level (e.g. 80 percent, etc . ). Doherty reached the same conclusion 
as Mossin and Smith . A final remark in his article notes that loss 
prevention by the insured is reduced by the purchase of insurance 
(the "moral hazard" argument). 
In another study, Doherty (1977) evaluates deductible insurance 
and full insurance for risk averter individuals. He concluded that 
unless the savings in premium with deductible insurance is greater than 
the mean value of uninsured risk, risk averters will choose to have 
full insurance without deducting any fixed amount. 
An experimental study on insurance decisions was conducted by 
Kunreuther and Schoemaker (1979) to assess the descriptive power of 
prospect theory and EUH. Their experiment focuses on four issues 
relevant to insurance. 
The first issue addresses people's concern to protect them-
selves against high-probability, low-loss events, or against low-
probability, high-loss events when expected values are equal. 
Both EUH and prospect theory agree that people prefer to be pro-
tected against low-probability, high-loss events when expected 
values are equal. The second issue considers the aspects of full 
coverage and coverage with deductible. Again, both theories agree 
that people prefer full coverage to an insurance policy with deductible. 
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Willingness to pay for comprehensive protection against po tential 
monetary losses is the third issue studied by Kunreuther and 
Schoemake r. Separate insurance policies may l ead to higher total 
cove r age than grouping policies together; s mall but likely loss 
may attrac t people to buy single coverage policy than a combined 
policy with a large but unlikely loss and a likely small loss. 
They prove d t hat individual policy maximum bids will equal the maxi-
mum bid for the comprehensive policy in both EUH and prospec t theory . 
Howeve r, interpretation of how the problem would be s tructured may l ead 
t o a diffe rence between prospect theory and EUH . 
The final issue is a hypothetical cas e in which premium and maxi-
mum coverage (liability ) are increased by a factor (K>l) and leaving the 
probabilities the same . Kunreuther and Schoemaker found that people pre-
fer i nsuran ce as K incr eases when using t he EUH app r oach . The orpos ite 
holds true for prospect theory unless p were excessivel y low to induce 
risk-aversion (overweigh ting effec t where n(p)>p) . 
A study of expected utility theory as a descriptive model was con-
ducted by Kunreuther (1978) on i ns urance cover age against floods and 
earthquakes . Kunreuther assess ed homeowners' subjective values of 
the probability of a disaster occurring, the cost per dollar of insur-
an ce , and the dollar loss resulting from the disaster . The assessments 
on these features were done by interviewing 2000 floodplain homeowners 
and 1000 living in earthquake areas . The gene ral conclusions of 
Kunreuther 's study are tha t people seldom have enough information to 
comply with Expec t e d Ut i lity theory and that if they do, their decisions 
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are often not consistent with the assumption of risk aversion or even 
more relaxed Expected Utility interpretations. 
In the same vein, Attanasi and Karlinger (1979) specified a model 
characterizing the individual's decision to purchase flood insurance. 
Using the EUH, their model solves for the optimal insurance coverage 
as a function of risk preferences, premium structure, a physical 
"damage function", and the probability distribution governing the 
occurrence of floods. They based the model on information from four 
towns in New Jersey exposed to floods. The risk preferences were ob-
tained by using Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk aversion (Arrow, 
1974) since their study assumed a bounded, monotone increasing, and 
concave (with respect to wealth) utility function. Their findings sug-
gest that the behavior of the sampled individuals who purchased flood 
insurance was not inconsistent with the EUH. Their estimated risk-
aversion coefficients were all positive and greater than zero (risk 
aversion). Finally, they suggested that efforts to inform residents 
of the damage of floods may influence risk preferences and increase 
participation in flood insurance programs. 
Ahsan et al . (1982) studied the capability of competitive markets 
to provide crop insurance. Imperfect information, specifically that 
on farmers' risk position, was hypothesized as the main reason a com-
petitive crop insurance market may not exist. If farmers have 
reasonable knowledge of their own risk position, insurance agencies, 
not having access to such information, may be unable to distinguish 
among customers. In this case, only high-risk farmers may buy crop 
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insurance, and, hence, insurance companies may incur heavy losses. 
Thus, agricultural policy makers are forced to consider public crop 
insurance. 
Premium rate-making in crop insurance programs is usually based on 
a normal yield distribution assumption. Yeh and Sun (1980) developed 
Pearson probability distributions of actual wheat yields for 14 crop 
districts of the province of Manitoba in Canada. The purpose was two-
fold: (1) to compare Pearson yield distributions to those of normal 
curve theory and (2) to obtain pure premium rates from the Pearson 
estimations . 
To examine the first purpose, they compared chi-square and F-
statistics of both normal and Pearson distributions . Nine out of the 
fourteen Pearson distributions showed a lower dispersion than their 
corresponding normal distributions. In general, the statistical tests 
suggest that Pearson wheat yield distribution was better than estimated 
normal distribution in those 14 districts. Based on these results, 
Yeh and Sun estimated pure (no subsidied) premium rates assuming both 
a normal and a Pearson distribution. In general, premium rates are 
underestimated when an estimated normal distribution is used. From the 
results of their study, they conclude that a normal distribution of 
yields may occur as a special case . Pearson distributions have the 
great advantage that an algebraic form of the distribution does not 
need to be specified a priori. Thus, a sound crop insurance program 
should evaluate yield distributions with the higher accuracy possible. 
More specifically, it might prevent under- or overestimation of premium 
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rates in multiperil crop insurance policies. 
Farmers' subjective probabilities were elicited by Grisley and 
Kellogg (1983) in Northern Thailand. They looked at farmers ' percep-
tions of yield, price, and net income expected next season by using 
an elicitation process with monetary rewards. They surveyed rice, 
tobacco, and soybean farmers. The subjective elicitation revealed 
that 43 percent of farmers' predictions were between -10 to +10 per-
cent different from actual results; 33 percent of the predictions 
were under -20 percent; and 23 percent were over +20 percent of 
actual yield, price, and net income. Farmers were more accurate in 
their rice predictions than for tobacco and soybeans. It was also 
found that surveyed farmers behaved as risk averters. 
The selected literature is presented below with the purpose of 
reviewing what has been written in regard to the Federal Crop Insurance 
(FCI) and selected risk management strategies in recent years. 
In a 1982 study, Kramer and Pope evaluated the performance of 
FCI. They showed that the subsidized FCI program would be preferred 
by risk averse farmers. With 17 years of historical data from a farm 
in Loudoun County, Virginia , they have demonstrated that actual yields 
were below 75 percent of the 10-year average in three years; only 
once did the actual yield fall below 65 percent of the average. If the 
farmers in Loudoun County had bought FCI at the 75 percent coverage 
level during the 17-year period, indemnities would be higher than possi-
ble premiums paid during the same period. Their analysis suggests 
that crop insurance "can be an attractive option for managing risk." 
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However, farmers' assessment of yield probabilities below 75 percent 
of their normal yields will determine, in general, t heir participation 
decision. 
Miller and Walter (1977) evaluated a lternative options for the 
Federal Government to cover crop losses due to natural hazards. FCI, 
Disaster Payments Program (DPP) 1 , and the private insurance industry 
were the i nstitutional instruments considered in their study. There are 
four not mutually exclusive options. The first option is to continue 
with current programs--the DPP and the FCI program--without modification. 
The DPP extends coverage mainly in high-risk areas where FIC is not 
available. However, the trend has been that disaster payments were made 
in counties where FCI was available, thus suggesting that DPP was a "free-
insurance" policy to f armers and that the FCIC and DPP overlapped the i r 
functi ons. Miller and Walter remarked here that this overlapping could 
be a possible cause of farmers ' low participation in the FCI program (17 
percent of eligible acreage in 1976). 
A subsidy to the private crop insurance industry is their second 
option. From a superficial analysis, Miller and Walter suggest that 
this option might be more costly than providing crop insurance through 
the FCIC. 
Their third option is to subsidize premiums of the FCI program and 
discontinue the DPP. They estimated that with a 25 percent of premium 
1 
DPP was introduced by the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act 
of 1973. This program l asted until the 1981 crop year and was mainly 
replaced by the FCI program as amended in 1980. 
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subsidy, farmers' participation in the FCI program would be increased 
up to 40 percent of the eligible acreage. The idea of this option was 
undertaken when the FCI program was restructued in the 1980 Act . 
Modification in the DPP is their fourth option. This includes 
lower yields guarantees for payments, elimination of the prevented 
planting coverage, increments in the payments rate, and other minor 
alternatives. 
Finally, Miller and Walter have concluded that the FCI program 
should concentrate its functions in low-risk areas and that the DPP is 
a better option to cover high-risk areas in agriculture. 
With a sample of ten dry land wheat farmers in Colorado, King and 
Oamek (1983) evaluated the effects of the elimination of DPP and the 
possible expansion of farmers' participation in the FCI program as 
amended in 1980. Evaluating different alternatives under the adjusted 
gross income criterion, they demonstrated that the elimination of DPP 
and the subsidization of FCI premiums may attract farmers to purchase 
FCI. However, farmers' "participation rates did not rise substantially 
in eastern Colorado for the 1982 crop year." They allude to the fact 
that FCI premiums account for up to 30 percent of variable cos t s for 
some of the farmers in the sample. It forces farmers to operate with-
out any protection against low yields. 
Although the results of King and Oamek's study cannot be used on an 
aggregate level, they conclude that the policy decision taken on the 
DPP and FCI programs in 1980-81 does not insure higher farmer partici-
pation in the latter. 
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In another study of FCI and DPP, Lemieux et al. (1982) compare 
the effects of (a) participation in the FCI program, (b) participa-
tion in the DPP, and (c) nonparticipation on a typical Texas High 
Plains cotton farm over a 10-year planning horizon. By establishing 
boundaries for four risk preference classes (prone, neutral, moderate-
ly risk averse , and risk averse), they compare programs' benefits on 
the present value of ending net worth of the 10-year period . Their 
conclusions based on stochastic dominance efficiency analysis show 
that for risk prone producers, DPP is as efficient as the highest level 
of FCI coverage (high yield) and high price selection) . A risk neutral 
producer should be indifferent among any FCI yield and price level 
of protection and DPP except for the low and medium price options of 
FCI . For a moderately risk averse producer , the results are similar 
except that low coverage (50 percent) and low price coverage of FCI 
is the only prospect on the risk averse's efficiency set . 
Farmers' choice of participating in government programs is better 
investigated under the EU theory (Kramer and Pope, 1981). By using 
intervals of risk levels (prone, neutral, and averter), Kramer and Pope 
1 studied the impact of 10 hypothetical cases of government programs and 
farm size. Their analysis was done under stochastic dominance to rank 
farmers ' choices . Low risk averse and risk prone farmers selected 
nonparticipation in 7 out of the 10 alternatives . Reduction in the 
1 
The government programs considered in their study were price 
support loans, disaster payments and deficiency payments programs . 
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requirements for farmers to participate in the disaster and deficiency 
payments programs and loan rates seem to result in a higher partici-
pation by low risk averters. 
Scott and Baker (1972) evaluated mean income under 10 states of 
nature, including from total idling of land to full participation 
in set-aside and price-support loan programs. It was demonstrated 
that risk aversion coefficients have no relationship to a person's 
l eaving the decision of an optimal farm plan to the farmer's own per-
ception of risk. 
Calculating mean income and standard error for the 10 prospects, 
Scott and Baker conclude that a nonrisk averse farmer would not 
participate in government programs. The opposite is true for a high 
risk averse farmer. Their results show that a higher income is ob-
tained with an open market corn price which also has a higher expected 
variance of income. Under government programs, mean income is lower 
but the variance is also lower. 
In a study conducted in Deuel County, Nebraska, Smith et al. 
(1972) show that self-insurance strategies (i.e., storage of grain, 
financ ial reserves, etc .) are preferred to FCI and commercial hail 
and fi re insurance if the opportunity cost is relatively low. At 10 
percent and 11 percent of opportunity cost, hail insurance and FCI 
become more desirable, respectively, than the self-insurance strate-
gies . 
Farmers who cannot self-protect against crop losses have FCI as the 
best second alternative of protection. The Smith study s uggests that 
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farm size is not as relevant as liquid funds in crop insurance planning. 
It is important to note that this study was conducted ten years before 
the passage of the FCI Act of 1980, which is quite different from the 
program alluded to in their study. 
Leverage and farm size also play an important role in farmers' 
risk preferences. Held and Helmers (1979) stress the impact of vari-
ous land appreciation rates on farm growth and survival against net 
farm income and cash flow. The attractiveness of land appreciation 
to increase farm size (then, net worth) could bring low net farm in-
comes and disastrous negative cash flow because of increasing land taxes 
and higher interest costs of short term obligations. Again, prices in 
the near future and yield distributions greatly influence possible re-
sults of land appreciation and changes in farm size. Net return per 
owned acre might be diminished as farm size increases. 
As a final conunent on the literature reviewed, it should be 
stressed that crop insurance has not been considered as an alterna-
tive of a broader risk management system. Crop insurance has been 
isolated or, at most, considered with other disaster payment programs. 
On the other hand, expected utility theory is used in most of the 
literature on crop insurance and insurance in general, though it has 
been shown to be inconsistent with individual preferences. 
Theoretical Model 
In this section, the impacts of crop insurance and other risk 
management strategies on farm returns are individually considered in a 
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flexible model with the following characteristics: 
(1) It is a single- period farm level model where farm planning ends 
with marketing operations of the harvested crop . 
(2) Pl anting and marketing of a single crop are the main source of 
revenue in the farm model. This ignores crop or livestock 
diversifications as an alternative management strategy . 
(3) Since it is a single-period model (i.e., one year) , cash flow 
after taxes and consumption is the maximization criterion selected 
to evaluate the worthiness of strategies. 
(4) Finally, yields , crop prices, and cash flows are the stochastic 
variables i n the maximization expression where input variables 
(i.e . production costs) are treated as known at the time the farmer 
makes activity decisions for the single-period plan . 
Several risk management strategies were mentioned in Chapter I . 
These can be grouped in four general areas : insurance, production , 
marketing, and financial strategies. The model will include the fol-
lowing strategies : 
(1) For insurance strategies, the model assumes the farmer carries 
property and life insurance which a r e considered as fixed cost 
items . The relevant insurance strategy is that directly re-
lated to crop production, specifically the Federal All-Risk 
Crop Insurance (FCI) as the strategy to be evaluated in the 
model . 
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(2) Farmers' participation in acreage reduction programs
1 
(i.e. set-
aside) of the federal government is the essential element of the 
model's production strategies. Other strategies implicitly 
assumed are good farming practices and flexible input uses. 
(3) To deal with the risk of fluctuations in commodity prices, the 
model considers the use of hedging in futures markets as a 
feasible marketing strategy. Another marketing strategy is 
storage of the production when higher cash prices are expected 
sometime after harvest. 
(4) Finally, farm leverage (debt to equity ratio) is included in the 
model as a financial tool that influences farmers' risk-bearing 
ability. 
For purposes of model presentation, the model is first given 
alone with none of the risk management strategies acting. This will 
be called the base prospect. Then, the model allows the inclusion of 
one strategy at a time. Such prospects are identified by the 
strategy--i.e., marketing prospect. Finally, each strategy prospect 
is compared to the base prospect. The comparisons are made to assess 
how yield, price, and cash flow distributions are altered by the manage-
ment options. 
Stochastic dominance concepts are used as an expository device in 
prospect comparisons. The basic idea is that it is possible to rule 
1 These federal farm programs normally compensate farmers by pro-
viding loan and target prices for their products. An exception to 
this was the payment-in-kind program where price support was not 
offered. 
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out as inefficient a prospect based only on broad characteristics of 
the decision maker, i.e. risk aversion (Anderson et al., 1977). The 
use of cumulative probability distribution (CPD) concepts supplies the 
analytical instrument for evaluating prospects under stochastic domi-
nance . The graph of a CPD indicates the probability of receiving a 
given level of returns or less. 
To rank CPDs of two prospects (i.e. CDPs of base and insurance 
prospects), two concepts of stochastic dominance are used: first- and 
second-degree stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD, respectively). FSD 
applies to all decision makers in regard to income maximization; i.e., 
at given probabilities, if the CPD of prospect "A" offers higher in-
comes than the CPD of prospect "B" , it is said that "A" dominates "B" 
in FSD. The idea of FSD agrees with the broad assumption of a farmer ' s 
monotonically increasing utility function . Finally, SSD applies to 
all risk averters (this is consistent with the assumption of concave 
utility function). This is more difficult to explain intuitively, but 
it will be illustrated with the prospect comparisons to be presented 
below. Stochastic dominance will be important in this study for two 
reasons. First, it will be useful in deriving theoretical results in 
this chapter. Second, it will play a crucial role in the empirical 
investigation described in Chapter IV. 
Base prospect 
Assume a farmer tries to maximize his end-of-period cash f l ow by 
planting and harvesting a single crop, i.e., corn or wheat. Follow-
ing Anderson et al. (1977, Chapter 6), we have in vectorial form, 
1 
where: 
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CFb = [ (P · Y - P ) • V - D - C ] • [ 1-T ] + DI F 
y v p d x 
(II . 7) 
CF "" vector of cash flows after income tax in model's base prospect; 
b 
P ·Y = price times yield vectors, both being assumed random and in-
y 
p 
v 
v 
DIF 
1 
2 dependent; P =(P-H); P=market price; and H=yield dependent 
y 
costs; 
3 yield independent costs, which are assumed fixed; 
total crop acreage, also assumed fixed; 
Total assets depreciation; 
4 
interest on borrowed capital; 
income tax rate at given level of i ncome; and 
D - PP; add back depreciation, D , and subtract principal pay-
P p 
ment, PP, to obtain account for real cash f lows. 
Variables in darker print are vectors of stochastic values for 
the r espective variables . 
2The assumption of independence between yields and prices appears 
reasonable in a micro-level model of decision making. This means 
individual farm production is uncorr elated with market production and, 
hence, price . If there e xists a correlation between prices and yields, 
i.e . , cov(Py,Y)/O, the analysis can still be carried out. However, the 
req uired algebraic manipulation becomes considerably more difficult. 
Although a single crop model is considered here, the essence of the 
results should also hold for the multi-crop case. 
3
This implies that costs are nonstochastic. This assumption makes 
the mode l more tractable, but it can be relaxed. 
4 
Interest on borrowed capital, Cd, is obtained from the following 
expression: 
Ca = FD·i; FD (a·l /l+l )·V =farm debt; 
where a = average asset value per acre, l = leverage level; and i = 
capital interes t rate . 
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From the expression in equation 11.7, values of CFb distribution 
can be obtained from vectors of independent values for prices, P , and 
y 
yields, Y. One would expect that low (or negative) cash flows, CFb, 
are caused by low yields, Y, and/or low prices, Py. Figure 11.1 por-
trays a hypothetical CPD of cash flows evaluated from given values of 
prices and yields at each point of the distribution. 
(-) 0 (+) Cash flows ($) 
Figure lI.l. Hypothetical cumulative distribution of cash flow, 
base prospect CFb 
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CFb=o+DIF when total revenue, P ·Y·V, equals total costs, P ·V. 
y v 
At this point, income taxes are also equal to zero since P ·Y-P ~O; i.e., y v 
gross income (P ·Y - P ·V) is equal to or less than zero. Thus, we y v 
see that negative cash flows might occur with a combination of low 
yields and low prices, or "normal" yields with low prices or vice-
versa. For instance, the probability of getting cash flows less than 
or equal to zero is p . in Figure 11.1. On the other hand, as revenues 
1 
surpass costs, cash flows move into the domain of positive values up to 
a maximum feasible level, i.e., the highest price and yield possible. 
Negative outcomes are of special concern to risk averse individuals 
who are willing to sacrifice higher outcomes in order to reduce the 
threat of potentially disastrous low outcomes. Let us now look at the 
impacts on CF distribution by the introduction of crop insurance into 
our original model. 
Crop insurance prospect 
With crop insurance, equation 11.7 can be restated as 
CF = [(P ·Y +I - P - E)·V-D -C ]·(1-T] + DIF 
I y v p d x (II . 8) 
where the new variables are: 
1 
I = indemnity per acre insured when yields are below a guaranteed 
yield per acre, Y*, and 
E dollar value of insurance premium per acre, assumed fixed. 
1 
For modeling purposes, acres insured are equal to acres planted 
which is equal to V in the equation. It is also assumed that I is sub-
ject to income tax. 
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Indemnities, I, are greater than zero wheneve r Y<Y* (guar~ntee 
yield). Otherwise, I=O. 
Based on equations II. 7 and II. 8 , the insure decision to insure can 
be characterized as a comparison of cash flows with insurance, CF1 , 
relative to cash flows without insurance , CFb. Figure II.2 helps us 
to vis ualize a hypothetical comparison. 
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(-) 0 (+) Cash flows ($) 
Figure 11.2. CPDs of hypothetical crop ins urance prospect, CF
1
, and 
base product, CFb 
51 
Purchase of crop insurance truncates the relevant yield distribu-
tion at a minimum equal to Y*. Price distribution remains unchanged. 
As a consequence, outcome distribution is pulled to the right at 
yields below Y* and bent back at values of Y~Y* by the absolute cost 
of the insurance premium--CF1 in Figure II . 2. It is important to 
note that although insurance reduces the absolute Amount of negative 
outcomes in the lower portion of the distribution of CF1 , the proba-
bility of such outcomes appears to be higher than without insurance 
whenever O~I~E and CF1<0, i.e., probability, p1 , compared to pb at an 
outcome equal to zero. It also holds true for outcomes on the posi-
tive domain, or, more generally, whenever Y~Y* and E>O. 
Because CPDs of CF
1 
and CFb cross once, crop insurance and base 
prospects are not dominated by each INFSD. Here, farmers' utility in 
each prospect is monotonically increasing. Assuming farmers' general 
r isk aversion, we can apply the SSD concept to the insurance and base 
prospects' CPDs. In Figure II.2, SSD requires the evaluation of the 
areas under CFb and CF1 's CPDs . The efficiency rule in SSD says that if 
the area under the CFb ~ the area under the CF1 , then CFb dominates 
CF1 in SSD. From Figure II.2, if the area "A" is greater than area 
"B", then CF
1 
dominates CFb. The size of these varies directly with 
i nsurance premium and protection levels. For example, if a higher 
premium is imposed on the same insurance protection, it will narrow 
area "A" and widen "B" and make insurance less attractive, or, in 
other words, make it less efficient compared to the base prospect in 
the SSD sense. 
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From anothe r perspective, area "B" represents the amount of in-
come a risk averter has to forego as a premium to reduce his proba-
bilities of ge t t ing l ow (or negative) incomes (area "A"). Thus , because 
of the risk r e ducing nat ur e of crop i nsur ance , a risk averse farmer 
s hould evaluat e a r eas "A" and "B" of Figure II . 2 as well as the vari-
ability o f returns . It is clear from the f igure that crop insurance 
does reduce the range of possible outcomes . In addition , insurance 
serves to reduce the adver se effect s of unusually bad draws on yield . In 
other words , the probabilities of low returns are reduced by the purchase 
of crop insurance . In evaluating these aspects, a risk averter may pur-
chase insurance if his gain in uti l ity by area "A" and variance effect 
reduction of ins urance is grea t er t han t he disuti l ity of area 11 811 • 
The CPDs of CF1 and CFb cross just once, allowing the fo l lowing 
assertion: it can be said that crop insurance pr ospect , CF1 , will domi-
na t e the base prospect, CFb, in SSD, if the mean of CF1 is greater than 
the mean of CFb, and if CF1 i s les s prone to low outcomes than CFb 
distribution (Haunnond, 19 74) . Again, from Figure II.2 we know that CFI 
we know that CF1 is less prone t o low outcomes. And, if in addition 
to this we know that mean of CF1 > mean of CFb , then CF1 
dominates CFb 
in SSD ; otherwise, numerical procedur es need to be used to determine SSD. 
1 Farm programs prospect 
Essentially , fa r m program participation r equires the division of 
some of the crop land in consideration in exchange for monetary or 
1Peat , Marwick , Mitchell & Co. published the "Agriculture and 
Food Act of 1981" where the major conunodities programs are described . 
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in-kind payments. 
If equation II.7 of base prospects is considered as a nonpartici-
pation prospect, the equation for a participation prospect should be: 
CF 
p 
where : 
[P ·Y- P ) ·V· (1-S) +PDIV + !DIV - D - Cd]• [1-T ] +DIF y v p x 
(II. 9) 
PDIV = d·Y·S·V total paid diversion: d =program payment per 
bushel; 
Y program yield used to calculate payment per diverted acre; 
!DIV P ·Z·Y·S·V = In-kind diversion: Z = percentage of program 
y 
-yield, Y, to be received in-kind per diverted acre; and 
S = proportion of acreage required to be set aside as a condi-
tion of program enrollment. 
Thus, DFP is one of the rewards granted by putting aside S per-
centage of the base acreage V. Another reward is the risk reducing 
effect on price distribution P by a loan price, FP, issued in the 
y 
farm programs. In other words, P distribution is now trtmcated to a 
y 
minimum price equal to FP. Yield distribution remains unaffected and 
the number of actual acres planted is now equal to V· (l-S) . However, 
set-aside may alter yield distribution because the farmer retires 
riskier or less productive land. 
To better visualize the effects of program participation, let us 
draw in Figure II . 3 a hypothetical distribution of cash flows tmder a 
farm programs prospect, CFP, and the base prospect, CFb (assuming no 
insurance and no farm program participation). 
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Figure II. 3. Hypothetical CPDs of farm programs participation, CF , p 
and base prospects, CFb 
Although total acres planted have been reduced by V·(l-S), the 
guarantee of a loan price plus the possible savings of set-aside acres 
in production costs when low yields occur (when Py•Y < P) cause 
the CPD of CFP to be on the right of CFb at least for low (or even 
negative) outcomes up to a point when the foregone income of unplanted 
acres (P ·Y·V·(l-S)) surpasses their costs (P ·V·(l-S), i.e . , where 
y v 
CFb and CFP cross (Figure II.3). 
Following a similar procedure as with crop insurance and base 
prospect, it can be said that the farm programs prospect dominates base 
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prospect in the SSD sense by evaluating the areas between the distribu-
tions CFb and CFP in Figure II.3. In brief, the probabilities associ-
ated with negative outcomes are reduced not only by a loan price but 
also by the risk protection offered by program participation in reduc-
ing the variability of cash flows. Finally, when the reward is mainly 
in-kind (i . e., payment with grain), such a farm program acts as a crop 
insurance instrument since it provides a sure yield level per acre 
unplanted. 
Marketing prospect 
Hedging is widely used among marketing strategies. By trading 
contracts in the futures markets, a farmer protects himself against 
the risk of sudden price changes (Chase, 1980). In this view, a 
hedger makes use of the futures contracts as a temporary substitute 
of a cash market operation that will come later in the season . Three 
concepts are important in hedging: futures prices, cash prices, and 
basis . 
Futures prices are established daily for several commodities and 
for specific months of the year. They reflect the buyers' and sellers ' 
intentions now on prices they would like to trade for their products 
on some future date. Cash prices are daily prices received, usually 
by farmers , and referred to as local cash prices . Finally, basis re-
flects differences between cash and futures markets, i.e., transporta-
tion. By definition, futures prices = Local cash prices +basis. 
Usually when a shortage in production exists, futures prices 
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are high and bas is is low. This simple fact ensures firs t that futures 
prices and cash prices f luctuate together in the same direction in 
response to market conditions ; and second , in connec ting the fluctua-
tion aspect , it actually permits hedging to work. However, pri ce 
ide ntity does not always hold true . Basis itself is a source of poten-
tial risk when it breaks the identi ty because of unexpec ted changing 
conditions in the marke ts, i . e . increases in fuel prices . In other 
words, hedging does not guarantee that profit will occur or losses will 
be avoided. Also, basis i s not onl y in function of futures and cash 
prices , but in the general l ocal market condi tions. 
An expression of cash flows with hedging s trategies would be 
{ [ (P + HR) · Y - P ] · V - D - Cd} • { 1-T } + DIF y v p x (II . 10) 
where the new variable 
II. 7 . 
Hedging stochas tic revenue whe r e P~ = f utures 
f 
price at the time of pl acing the hedge, Pt+l = futures price 
at the time of lifting the hedge, and K 
1 produc tion hedged. 
proportion of 
Except for P , the r es t of the va riables remain as in e quation y 
P i s now a vector of cash prices di r ectl y r e lated to f utures y 
prices . For i nstance , the difference between Pf and P narrows a s the 
y 
1
If P~+i>P~ , then a profit is accrued . If P~+i<P~, a loss is ex-
perienced. Normally, hedged bushe l s ar e sold in the cash market at the 
time the hedge is li f t ed . 
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maturity month approaches. Since independence of prices and yields 
is assumed, farmers' yield distribution remains unaltered and it does 
not influence market prices. 
The impact of hedging is better seen in analyzing cash price, P , 
y 
and futures price, Pf, distributions. Figure II.4 portrays CPDs for 
P and HP. 
y 
Figure II.4. 
Prices ($) 
f CPDs for hypothetical futures price P , and cash price, 
Py distributions 
The position of the HP distribution depends on the futures price 
f 
at the time . the hedge is placed (P )--given that the distribution of 
f basis is constant. Thus, if P and P cross just once, a hedging prospect 
y 
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dominates a base prospect (of cash marketing) in SSD, if the mean of Pf 
is greater than the mean of P • Finally, the hedge option is likely 
y 
to reduce price variability if basis distribution is narrower than 
cash price distribution. 
Leverage level 
In general terms, leverage is equal to the ration of the firm's 
total debt to its equity . A high leverage level means more capital has 
been borrowed, permitting increased farm operations and farm revenues 
that otherwise would not be possible. However, along with borrowed 
capital, a financial risk is created in the form of fixed financial com-
mitments, i.e., repayment of principal and interest. As a consequence, 
more leverage means higher financial risk. 
Thus, on one hand, as leverage increases, it is likely that farm 
returns will also increase and, perhaps, risk in some other areas of 
farming activities will be reduced, with an improved irrigation system, 
for example . On the other hand, leverage is itself a source of risk be-
cause of its commitments to lenders. In brief, the utility a farmer gets 
from borrowing capital is a function of its risk and expected returns. 
An expression for cash flows under a leverage prospect resembles 
that of equation II . 7. It is 
[(P •Y-P )•V - D -C ]·[1- T] + Dp-PP (II.11) y v p d x 
Leverage affects Cd and PP through the farm debt (FD). FD 
(a· i /Hi )·V; a= asset value per acre V, and i =leverage level. If V 
and a are held constant, a higher i means a higher debt, FD, is carried 
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on the farm. 
An immediate effect of leverage in cash flows , CFL, is that they 
are reduced as leverage increases. Another aspect of leverage is 
that it has some relation to farm size (or total crop acres), V. 
A fa rmer may borrow capital to increase farm acreage or may use 
it to purchase new machinery or some other invest~ents in the 
farm. In regard to taxes, they are likely to be less with a high 
l everage position. Thus, leverage alters farm cash flows through 
P , V, T and DIF of equation II.11. It should be noted that P and 
v x y 
Y distributions have not been altered by leverage. 
For a given equity base, a farmer may expand total operation by 
using borrowed capital (nonequity capital). By transforming cash flows 
from a leverage prospect and a nonleverage (base) prospect into rates 
1 of return to equity capital, we see that leverage is advantageous if 
returns are good (i.e., >O); otherwise, leverage will have a negative 
expansive effect on farmer's income. These aspects are portrayed in 
Figure II . 5. 
Based on return to equity, producers' preferences for leverage 
are likely to differ, given the risk involved in it. Thus, it sug-
gests we consider the role of leverage in our model as a measure 
of farmer risk bearing ability which may influence the performance of 
other risk management strategies in the model. 
1 
Here, return to equity capital is what remains after paying the 
interest on borrowed capital. 
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Figure II.5. CPDs of return to equi ty for a nonleveraged prospect 
and a l everage prospect 
Implications 
In general, the reviewed literature on risk and crop insurance 
and the model developed provide the basic elements to empirically 
evaluate the performance of crop insurance and its alternative risk 
control instruments. The next chapter presents the empirical model 
for this purpose. 
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CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Introduction 
Once we have established a theoretical f ramework of risk management 
strategies, we are now in a position to set up a computer model which 
will empirically evaluate the risk-reducing strategies of the theoreti-
cal model. 
In addition, the computer model to be developed can be seen as a 
practical tool to evaluate and select an optimum farm plan under risk 
when a farme r' s attitude toward it is unknown or difficult to elicit. 
Thus, the model not only serves to ascertain the merit of management 
strategies but also to judge farm plans when risk exposure is complex 
and difficult to assess. Briefly, this chapter will : (1) specify an 
empirical computer model, define variables in the model, and show how 
they are interrelated; (2) discuss data sources for the variables in 
the model, assumptions, and estimation problems; and (3) describe the 
computer model operation, algorithm , and solution and experimen~al 
techniques . A description of each of these aspects follows. 
The Computer Model 
The goal 
We have stated in the theoretical model that the evaluation criterion 
of risk management strategies is cash flow after consumption (CFAC). 
Thus, the goal of the model is to capture the effect of any single or 
combined interaction of strategies on cash flows and some collateral 
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impacts on taxes , farm ne t worth, and debt position (i . e ., cash flows 
as a per centage of net worth). 
Specifications of risk management strategies 
In order to get a CFAC, we need to establish the specific ways in 
which insurance , leverage, marketing, and farm programs will be numeri-
call y considered in the computer model. 
Starting with leve rage , it i s included in a way that any leverage 
level (debt to equity ratio) can be stated. It is also used to calcu-
late the amount of farm debt for a given l and value per acre . This 
land value is the sum of eq uity and non-equi ty capital including 
rente d land and/or machinery, i f any . 
In the case of crop insurance, the different coverage and price 
protection levels of Federal Crop Insurance (FCI) are essentially th e 
insurance alterna tives considered in the model. The model asks for 
information, such as area average yield and proven farm yield (accord-
ing to FCI s tanda rds). It also inquires for specific price , coverage , 
and premium l evels in o r der to ob tain guaranteed bushels, and possible 
indemnities . 
I n the marke ting case , pre-harvest , as well as post-harves t hedges 
a r e available in the mode l along with direc t fall cash sale (Oct .-Nov . ) 
and direc t summe r cash sal e (June-July after harvest). Pre-harvest 
hedges can be placed in any month afte r planting and befo re harvesting. 
Here , because actual yi e ld per acre is still unknown, an expected y i e ld 
is used instead . The hedged bushels a r e automatically sold during 
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the fall as an indirect fall cash sal e . Additionally , an expected 
local hedge price at pre-harvest time is matched with a l ocal hedge 
price at harvest time to obtain any pre-hedge gain or loss. 
A post-harvest hedge is similar to the pre-harvest hedge. One 
distinc tion is that the post-harvest hedge uses actual yields instead 
of expected ones . Another distinction is that t he futures contracts 
are only placed at harvest time (Oct .-Nov . ) and with a fixed delivery 
time of nine months l ater (June-July ) . The reason fo r this is given 
in the f arm programs specifications. All post-harvest hedged bushels 
must be sold at the con tract maturity time. Detai l s of hedging prices 
are given in the next subsection . 
Whatever is not hedged has to be sold either as a direct fall 
or summe r cash sale . A r eason for a fall sale is to cover some cash 
expenses due at harvest. In a s ummer sale, it is possible that stor-
ing the crop might pay for itself with better crop prices in summer. 
For f arm pr ogram participation, the following feat ures of govern-
ment farm programs are considered in the model: 
(1) An acreage r eduction which is considered as an unpaid diversion 
that might be r eq uired for eligibility in other farm program(s) 
(i.e ., PIK Program). 
(2) Eligibility for a short-term price suppor t loan and/or target 
price. 
(3) A paid land diversion option from which some cash is r eceived at 
harves t for setting aside a portion of the crop land. 
(4) A Payment-In-Kin d (PIK) Program which allows for any set-aside 
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level that it may require. It also specifies a percentage 
of the ASCS crop yield to be paid (in-kind) per acre in the pro-
gram. 
It is important to note in point (2) that the loan is fixed to 
nine months according to the 1983 program . It is given at harvest 
and repaid or forfeited in the summer (nine months later). The loan 
is repaid if the summer cash price is higher than the loan rate plus 
interest on the loan; otherwise, no repayment is made, and the stored 
grain is turned over to the government. 
This price support loan program is the main reason for setting 
both the post-harvest hedge and the summer cash sale to nine months 
after harvest. In this way, stored grain in the loan program can also 
be used against a post-harvest hedge contract and vice versa. 
Finally, the target price is used against an average cash price 
calculated by a formula in the computer model . The difference between 
both is used to obtain deficiency payments . 
These specifications of management strategies make up the main 
f rame of the model. The remainder of this section will explain the 
elements, characteristics, and limitations of the model . 
The elements of the model 
Basically, the model is composed of five major elements which 
are shown in Diagram III.l. The first step is to obtain the necessary 
information to calculate revenues and costs of operating the farm. 
Next, income taxes and conslllllption expenditures are introduced to 
(B) 
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Basic Information: 
(A) - Yields 
Calculate 
Revenues 
- Prices 
- Fann Data 
Evaluation of 
(D) Cash Flows after 
Consumption and 
Taxes (CFAC) 
(E) Evaluate 
Prospects 
Diagram III.1. The computer model flow 
Calculate 
Costs 
(C) 
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finally get CFAC (step D) . These fi rst four s t eps form what will be 
called a "prospect". The last part of the model (step E) compares 
the risk-reducing efficiencies of prospects among them. An explanation 
of each of the five steps follows. 
Under basic information (step A), a list of 38 input variables i s 
1 
needed to operate s teps B and C of the model. Variables such as 
land operated, interest cost of borrowed capital, variable cost of 
produc tion, and yield pe r acr e are included i n the list. 
This set of variables is better unders tood in steps B and C where 
revenues and costs are calculated respectively. The codes of Appendi x 
Bare used in all following expr essions . Additionally , all sources of 
revenues and costs are brought to a present value a t harvest time . 
Thus, CFAC r epresent harvest time values. 
Revenues The final equation of revenues is1 
REV (CPF) · (PHBu + CSFBu) + (CPS)(SCSSBu) + HEREV + 
(LR)(LOCANBu) + DEPAY + LADP + FCI (III. l) 
The first expression of the RHS in equation III.l is the income 
from fall cash sal es , which is simply the sum of pre- harvest hedged 
and direct fall sale bushels times the cash price in the fall (CPF) . 
This CPF is equal to a f all futures price (FPF) minus a fall basis 
(FB). 
1 
See Appendix B fo r the variables list and their codes . 
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The s econd term in the RRS of equation 111.1 is the revenue from the 
sUDIDler cash sale. I t is again the sum of post-harvest hedged and di rect 
summer sale bushels times the cash price in the s wmne r (CPS). This is 
a summer f utures price (FPS) mi nus a summer basis (SB) . The final 
amount is brought to a harvest-time value. 
Any gain or loss by pre- and/or post-harvest hedging is captured 
in the third term of the r evenue equation (HEREV) , the difference 
between pre-harvest (post-harvest) futures pr i ce and fall (summer) 
fu tures. 
For government farm programs , in a case in which a loan is 
asked for and is forfeited, it is similar to selling the bushels 
under loan at a price equal to the loan r ate. This is r eflected 
in (LR·LOANBu) in equation III.l. Defici ency payment (DEPAY) is 
calculated from a target price (TP) and an average cash price (ACP) 1 
per bushel received during the five months after harvest. Finally, en-
tries from land paid diversion payments are reflected in LADP. The last 
expression of the revenue equation accoWlts for any indemnity received 
if FCI was purchased. This varies among coverage and price levels 
sel ected and if area average yiel d (AAY), or individual yield plan (IYP), 
is in effect . 
Thus, the revenue equation accoWlts for insurance as well as 
marketing and farm programs participation st rategies . All of them can 
act independently or combined. The next step is to obtain farm 
1 
The ACP was obtained by the next expression: ACP = CPF + CPS/CPF - 1 
which is an approximation to the five-month average . 
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operation costs. 
Costs Following a similar exposition procedure as in revenues, 
the equa tion of costs is 
TOP TFC + TMC + TPC (III. 2) 
where: 
TOP = total operating cos t s ; 
TFC total finan cial costs ; 
TMC total marketing costs; and 
TPC total production cos t s. 
In order, TFC is interest on borrowed capital and repayment of 
principal. TMC is hedging cost (i.e., broker ' s commission) and storage 
cost of Stmmler bushels . Finally, TPC is the s um of fixed and variable 
costs of production (FPC and VPC, respectively). 
Estimated FPC is basically machinery depreciation, excluding labor 
and land cash rent equivalent. These last two items are seen as a re-
turn to capital and they form part of cash flows which can be looked at 
as r e tained earnings. 
On the other hand, VPC is formed by: 
VPC (VC) · (AP) + (AP)·(YIELD)·(HC) + (MC)·(UPA) + PREM (III. 3) 
where the first term of the RHS of equation III.3 is all yield-inde-
pendent variables cos ts (i.e., seed , fertilizer, etc.). The yield-
dependent costs are reflected in the second term in equation III .3. 
They are those harvest costs such as fuel that vary with actual yield 
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per acre. The maintenance cost of unplanted acres (UPA) i s added to 
account for set-aside acres under farm programs . 
Any insurance premium is expressed in equation III.3 by the 
variable PREM. Again, the premium varies depending on selected coverage 
and price levels, but the premium is calculated using AAY and not IYP 
in case the latter is used for indemnities. 
Up to now we have constructed the major elements of the model 
(revenues and costs). They are the inputs of the next element (step D), 
in which cash flows are calculated. 
Cash flows By s ubtracting costs from revenues, we obtain a 
taxable farm income (TFI) which is the feature used to calculate income 
taxes. 
Mathematically, 
TFI REV - TOP (III.4) 
Federal, state and self-employment taxes are applied to TFI. The 
result is a farm income after taxes or "net fa rm income" (NFI). 
Cash flows are real inflows and outflows of money on the fa rm. 
Thus, since principal payments on borrowed capital represent a 
real outflow of money, they are subtracted from NFI . Similarly, 
depreciation is no t a real outflow of money; it is added back to NFI. 
The result of these two changes gives us a net cash flow after taxes 
(NCF). In mathematical terms, we have, 
NCF = NFI - PP + DEP (III.5) 
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The f inal s tep in this element is to subtract fami l y expenditures 
1 (consumption) t o get a net cash flow af ter cons umpt ion (CFAC) . This 
is 
CFAC NCF - CONSP (III . 6) 
This final step completes a so-called "prospect. " In each 
prospect , a specific combination of risk s trategies is stated. The 
prospects can be viewed as semi-final products of t he computer model. 
The final product of the model is the nrospects evaluation (step 
E, Diagram III .l). Here, CFACs of each prospect are compared against 
each other in two main approaches . The first is an informative ap-
proach to describe certain characteristics of each prospect where 
diffe rent strategies intervene. This approach will serve as a 
background to support a more formal approach of s t ochast i c dominance. 
By assuming certain properties of a farmer ' s utility function , stochastic 
dominance evaluates efficiencies of risk management alternatives among 
prospec t s . 
In essence, the computer model 
(1) i s developed to be applied on a farm level; 
(2) is f l exible enough to accept any respecification of farm data 
and/or risk-bearing alternatives within the main framework of 
management str a t egies assumed in the model; 
(3) is able to cal c ulate both net farm income and cash flows afte r 
1
The idea of CFAC is to look at them as real retained earnings in 
the farm. 
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consumption to fit different purposes. Calculations are 
at crop harvest time values. 
(4) Moreover, any subjective elicitation of yield and price 
distribution, which in turn bring subjective outcomes, can 
easily be introduced in the model . This means the model 
can fit the specific farmers' perceptions. 
(5) Finally, and most importantly, the computer model will help 
us study the problem of low participation among farmers in 
the federal crop insurance program. 
Data Sources 
The next action in the development of the computer model is to 
identify data sources. For this purpose, three sets of data sources, 
described below, have been established: farm level data, yield data, 
and price data. These sets provide the information for the 38 input 
variables in the model. 
Farm level data 
Farm level data deal with crop production costs, farm management 
aspects, and income taxes and consumption information. A common 
point is that they are somewhat controlled and manipulated by the farm 
operator, who decides on acres to operate (either rented or owned) , on 
land investment, and on how much capital to borrow at a given interest 
rate, among other factors. 
The data for production (fixed, pre-harvest, and harvest) costs 
were obtained from the 1983 estimated costs of crop production in 
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Iowa, published by the Cooperative Extension Service at I owa Stat e 
University (FM 1712). This report reflects average costs of purchased 
inputs for several crops and yields per acre. 
The farm management information contains details of insurance, 
marketing, and farm programs. Crop insurance features are obtained 
from the actuarial documents of the Federal Crop I nsurance Corpora-
tion. They include county coverage and rate tables from which premium 
and indemnities are acquir ed . Different documents are published for 
each county in the state (at least in the case of Iowa). This means 
that insurance data differ from county to county. The actual document 
for O' Brien County will be used in the analysis in Chapter IV . 
Since marketing decisions depend on futures prices and basis, 
they are included in the discussion of "prices sources." Finally, the 
1983 Feed Grain P~ogram is the source of the information on farm pro-
gram participation. Again , the relevant information for the state of 
Iowa is selected for the analysis in Chapter IV. No discussion of 
these farm management sources is included since no estimation of data 
has been done at this point. 
Farmers pay income taxes on three levels: federal, state, and 
self-employment. Schedule Y (married taxpayers) of the 1983 Tax Ra te 
Schedules was used to estimate federal tax. 1 A state tax table was 
obtained from the 1983 Iowa 1040 Long Form Individual Income Tax 
1 
Internal Revenue Service, 1983b. 
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Return. Finally, the self-employment tax rate was 9 . 35% of estimated 
1 
taxable farm income . 
The last item to be considered as farm level data is consumption, 
which refers to family living expenditures such as f ood, clothing, 
etc . These expenses are included in the estimation of cash flows 
since first they are essential to survive, and second are used to 
estimate cash flows as returns to labor and capital (retain earnings) 
aft e r consump tion . 
After attempting to estimate a consumption expression (as a 
function of farm income) using Iowa farm families surveys, it was de-
cided to fix consumption as an amount that is regarded as a minimum 
needed for living. This amount is $15,000, which represents only cash 
expenses for living. Such a value was obtained from a 1982 survey value 
inflated to 1983 terms. The estimation attempts failed for two reasons : 
first, missing values in consumption and income variables significantly 
reduced the sample size; and secondly, even when a regression could be 
done, consumption was not significantly altered from $15,000 to justify 
the inclusion of such a consumption function in the computer model . 
Yield data 
Since crop insurance features are directly related to yield levels 
and their probabilities, it is important to estimate them carefultY• 
A discussion of yield distributions is followed by an empirically 
1 
Internal Revenue Service, 1983a. 
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estimated yield distribution . 
The essence of crop insurance is mainly concentrated chiefly on the 
lower tail of a "possible" yield distribution. It is widely accepted that 
a low yield1 (eventually 0) does occur. But what is difficult to assess 
is how frequently it occurs. Thus, if one overestimates the probability 
of low yields, c rop insurance (FCI in this case) will look like a very 
rewarding strategy . On the other hand , insurance might be viewed as 
unattractive when one underestimates the probability of low yields . 
Therefore, an important question should be raised at this point: what 
is the yield distribution that ensures us an accurate evaluation of the 
merits of crop insurance and its competitor s trategies? 
In add r essing the ques tion, such a distribution can be elicited 
ei ther subjectively or historically . Nelson et al. (1978) identify the 
following four general approaches for field elicitation of subjective 
probabilities: 
(1) The cumulative distribution approach; 
(2) the conviction we ights method; 
(3) direct elicitation of probabilities; and 
(4) triangular distribution method. 
These approaches r equire a response from the decision maker in order 
to draw either a cumulative distribution function (CDF) or a probability 
density function (PDF). Answering the question posed above through a 
subjective approach requires t wo things: Knowledge of the decision 
maker ' s utility function from which attitudes can be derived to shape 
1 . A yield covered by most of the insurance policies. 
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the subjective yield distribution and a narrowed scope of the thesis 
into a case study. Because of the time and cost needed to collect 
the responses, it was decided to exploit the historical approach. 
Historical yield records were collected from three farms in Iowa, 
1 the Crawford, Hancock, and Sutherland farms. The central idea of 
considering three sets of data instead of just one is to look for a 
consensus on yield distributions. In addition, they are the best time 
series yield data in Iowa available for study. Estimation of a yield 
distribution for each farm follows. 2 
Crawford farm data The Crawford farm is located in west-
central Iowa in the county of the same name. It is primarily in the 
Ida-Monona soil association area of Iowa. Corn has been the major crop 
produced since the farm started operation in 1956. During this 27-year 
period, corn acreage increased from 55 acres to 282 acres. The land 
use system of row cropping was designed to improve soil productivity, 
minimize erosion, and improve crop yields. This has required a continued 
adoption of new technologies. Normal annual total precipitation in 
Denison, Iowa, which is located a few miles from the Crawford farm, 
is approximately 30 inches per year. 
1The first two farms are commercial farms administered by the 
Iowa State University Agricultural Foundation, which is a non-profit 
corporation for educational and scientific purposes. The third farm 
is an experimental farm. 
2 
The estimation procedures to be shown for the three farm data 
sets were suggested by Dr. Vince Sposito and Dr. Wayne Fuller from the 
Department of Statistics, Iowa State University. 
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Figure III .l(a) shows the plot of actual corn yields per acre dur-
ing the 1957-1982 period. Since the farm adopted new changing tech-
nologies, detrend of the data is suggested in order to measure tech-
nological effects. No significant trend is observed from the graph. 
Thus, the residuals of the detrended series follow exact l y the same 
pat tern of the original yield se ries . 
The lack of an upward trend is blamed on the fact that corn acre-
age was increased by incorporating marginal land (land of lower quality) 
into production, thus diminishing average yields of the total corn 
field. However , implementation of new technol ogies has compensated 
for the lower productive land. 
In order to gain some i nsight on how the PDF of the y i e ld distribu-
tion for Cr awford farm looks, a histogram is presented at the bottom of 
Figure III.l. It strongly s uggests that Crawford data are normally 
dist ributed. 
The fi r st step was to reach a transformation of the data to a func-
tion which would have all the statistical appear required by statis-
ticians. Transformations such as square root, square values and ab-
solute values (to mention a few) of residuals were worked out, but 
none of them passes the ' t ' of student test. So it was decided t o do 
a normality t est since the Crawford histogram (Figure III.l(b)) evokes 
a normal dis tribution. Also , the mean, median and mode (77 . 07 , 78, and 
78 , r espectivel y) of the Crawford data are practically the same , which 
implies symmetry of the distribution . 
The normal test can be easily done by a graph . If the cumulative 
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frequencies follow a straight line when plotted on normal probability 
paper, a normal probability process is ope rative (Anderson e t al . , 1977) . 
The graph of Crawford cumulative f r equencies is shown in Figure III.2 . 
To fit a normal dis tribution, all we need t o do is place a str aigh t line 
through the data of Figure III . 2. This is shown by the unbroken line . 
The parameters of the normal distribution can then be read directly 
from the graph ; the mean co rresponds to the 0 . 5 f ractil e and is indi-
cated by the unbroken line as 75 bu/Ac . The standar d deviation (S . D. ) 
can be fo und at the 0 . 841 fractile of the cumulative frequency since 
84 . 1% of the area under a normal PDF lies below the mean plus one stand-
a r d devia tion. From Figure III . 2 , the 0 . 841 fractile is read off t he 
f itted s traight line as 96 bu/Ac, so one S .D. is 96-75=21 bu/Ac . The 
mean and S. D. of the fitted normal distribution a r e not notably 
different from the observed data (in fac t, mean and S. D. values dif-
fer by 2 bu/Ac only) . Thus, normal distribution is regarded as the 
distribution that better app r oximates the Crawford data . 
Hancock farm data The Hancock fa rm is located in the Clarion-
Webs t er- Nicollet soil association area of Iowa (nor thcentral Iowa) . 
Conservation practices to improve the drainage on t he farm , in addi-
tion to row crop production, were the land-use sys tem developed on the 
Hancock fa rm. 
Corn and soybeans have been the major crops grown on the f arm. The 
average acreage of corn planted during the 1954-1982 period is 120 acres, 
varying from 62 acres to a high of 154 ac r es . Hancock corn yields are 
shown in Figure III.3 . Over the past 27 years , corn yields have ranged 
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from a low of 58 bu/Ac in 1955 to a high of 154 bu/Ac in 1981. While 
this represents a 266% variation, yields have tended to show a definite 
upward trend, as shown in Figure III.3(a). 
A histogram of the same data is portrayed in Figure III.3(b) . It 
does not show any clear indication that Hancock yields are normally 
distributed. 
1 In fact, a normality test was performed affirming that a 
normal distribution (mean = 0 and variance = 1) does not fit Hancock 
historical data. Rather, the histogram suggests a negative skewed 
distribution. 
Thus, the Hancock yields (Yt) were regressed against time in 
order to take technological effects out. The regression equation is: 
where: 
A 
57.987 + 2.983 T 
(3 . 388) (0.197) 
DW. = 1.619 
YT fi tted yield value at year T; 
T year (1954-1982); and 
DW. Durbin-Watson statistic. 
(III. 7) 
From here, the residuals (Yt - YT) were calculated for each of the 
29 observations. A plot of the residual (see Appendix C) reveals that 
the variance is not constant but increases with time, implying that a 
transformation on the observations YT is needed before any further 
analys is (Draper and Smith, 1966). 
1 Performed using the "univariate" procedure of the SAS computer 
package. 
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In order t o bring the variance to a constant, a transformation, 
suggested by Dr. Wayne Ful ler from the Statistics Department at Iowa 
State Unive r sity, was implemented. This is 
YT 1 T 
6+0. ZT regressed on 6+o. ZT ' and 6+0 . 2T 
The new term in the above expression is ( 6+0~ 2T), whi ch will bring 
the variance to a constant along the r esiduals time- path . Thus, we have 
gotten rid of the increasing variance without substantially altering the 
r egression coefficients of equation I II.7. Now, the transformed expres-
sion is : 
where : 
y* 
T 
T* 
6+0.2T 
T 
6+0. 2T 
57.557 (6+o ZT) + 2.897 T* (2 . 541) . (0.177) 
1 
which is normally distributed with N - (µ, o2 ) . 
Once we have a transformation where the errors are normally 
(III . 8) 
distributed and constant variance, the next step is to find the distri-
bution function that f its our transformation. What fo llows is an ap-
proach s uggested by Dr . Fuller . 
This approach consists of altering a normal CDF (N-(0,1)) by 
generating a normal deviate (N- (0,0. 7951))and a deviate cal culated 
1 
0 and 0. 795 are the mean and variance of the residuals of expres-
sion III . 8 above. 
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from a series of interval functions developed by Fuller. These two 
1 
"noises" are added to the 1982 detrended value of 142 bu/Ac. Graphi-
cally, Figure III.4 portrays the transformed function with a mean of 142 
and variance of a~, along with a normal function with the same mean but 
with a variance equal to a~ instead of ai (where o~ > oi). 
A characteristic of the transformed function is that it is continu-
ous. A setback in this fitted function is that when a sample is drawn, 
the lowest possible yield value obtained is approximately 108.4 bu/Ac 
with a probability close to zero (0.0009)·. It means that the chances of 
getting a lower yield are zero. This might be the case for Hancock farm, 
as it is partially supported by the yields registered in the farm in the 
last seven years. 
Sutherland farm data The Sutherland farm is situated in O'Brien 
County, which is located in the northwest corner of Iowa. The farm is 
on Galva-Primghar, Sac, and Marcus soils. Rainfall in the area averages 
about 26 inches per year, which is the lowest amount in the state . 
Consequently, water conservation practices are extremely important on 
the farm. 
Fertility, tillage, planting population, moisture conservation, and 
crop variety testing are the major areas of activity on the farm. Under 
these activities, a long-term experiment was started for corn in 1960 . 
Corn yields from 1961 through 1981 have been collected from this experi-
ment where the same crop practices have been applied since 1960. Thus, 
cons tant technology is a major characteristic of the farm corn yield 
1
see Appendix C for details . 
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data. 
Actual yields of Sutherland farm are plotted in Figure III .S(a) . Ex-
cept for the unusual observation of 3 bu/Ac in 1968, Sutherland data re-
fleet a flat trend during the 1961-1981 period. A histogram of the same 
data is shown in Figure III.S(b). Again, no evidence is seen that pre-
sumes a normal distribution of Sutherland data. It rather suggests a 
negative skewed distribution {extended left tail). Thus, the task is 
again to search for the appropriate yield distribution for Sutherland 
farm. 
A procedure similar to that followed with Crawford and Hancock data 
is used for Suthe rland data. With the advice of Dr. Fuller, the selected 
distribution function is a proportional weight of two normals with dif-
ferent mean and variance. The normal functions and their weights are: 
N
1 
(7, (19) 2) 
N2 (-63, (23)
2) 
Weight 
.9 
.1 
A mathematical expression looks like, 
where : 
Fx(x) = P { X~x } = P{X=X1}·P{X1Sx} + P{X=X2 } ·P { X2~X} 
Fx(x) = 0.9 $ (7, (19) 2) + 0.1 ~ (-63, (23) 2) 
FX(x) = a continuous cumulative distribution function; 
(III.9) 
(III.9') 
¢(7,(19) 2) - a normal cumulative f\.lllction with mean 7 and S.D. 19; and 
$ {-63i23) 2) = a normal cumulative function with mean -63 and S.D. 23. 
The weights 0.9 and 0.1 are directly rela ted to the means of both 
normal functions. If we multiply each mean of the normal functions to 
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its respective weight and add them, we are centering the distribution 
1 to zero. 
Figure III.6 shows the estimated CDF of the function expressed in 
equation III.9' (unbroken line). In the same graphic, a generated sample 
of the estimated CDF2 is also plotted in a broken line. It can be seen 
that the sample CDF resembles the estimated CDF . 
It was noted that the mean values of the two normal functions 
(7 and -63 , respectively) have the purpose of centering the third func-
tion (equation III . 9 ' ) to zero. But what do the values of their r espec-
tive variance ((19) 2 and (23) 2) mean? The answer is simple: "to give a 
good visual fit of the sample CDF to the estimated CDF." Actually, the 
variance of the sample is less than the variance of the estimate . This 
is true since the sample has only 100 points of the continuous estimated 
CDF . 
In order to clarify the CDF of Sutherland data, a probability 
density function (PDF) is drawn in Figure III. 7. The PDF has a left 
spreaded tail with a leaning hump to the right tail. This PDF is the 
derivative of the sample CDF which has a mean of 105.7 and S .D. of 
31. 6 bu/Ac . 
Selecting i!. farm yield distribution Three farm yield distribu-
tions have been estimated for three different farms. Since no strong 
consensus was found, it was necessary to choose one among them. Such 
1 (0.9)(7) + (0 . 1)(-63) = O; later we add up the mean of Sutherland 
data to center the distribution on it. 
2 
The procedure that generated the sample is displayed in Appendix C. 
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yield distribution shall be used for the study purposes . 
Crawford yield distribution follows a normal distribution with an 
estimated mean of 75 and a standard deviation of 31 bu/Ac. No direct 
problem was found wi t h the distribution ; rather, it is easy to work 
with . However, a major setback is caused by the lower quality land that 
had been added to the existing corn acres . The main problem is that 
yields from the marginal land have been averaged with previous corn 
acres . This bias migh t have allowed t he Crawford yield distribution to 
become a normal distr ibution in which the real distribution could be dif-
ferent from the normal if the marginal land were not considered . Thus, 
this bias in Crawford farm yields made us reject it for analysis purposes . 
The case with Hancock yield di stribution is somewhat different from 
the Crawford distribution . The concern is that Hancock distribution 
gives a probability of zero to yields below 108.4 bu/Ac . This is mainly 
because the distribution is centered at 142 bu/Ac with a small S. D. of 
11 . 20 bu/Ac. However, conunon sense tells us that even a yield of zero 
bu/Ac is possible, though with a very small probability. Conseq uently , 
Hancock distribution is also rej ected for estimation purposes. 
Finally, and not because the fo rmer two distributions were r ejected, 
the Sutherland yield distribution will be used in the estimations to be 
made by the computer model . It has both the statistical appeals and 
the economic sense demanded for analysis. 
Price data 
The last of the data sources to be discussed is prices, which are 
directly related to marketing s trategies . Since pre-harvest hedging 
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(after planting and before harvest) and pos t-harvest hedging are both 
considered in the model, two futures prices options and two basis op-
tions need to be evaluated: (1) fall futures delivery with its 
respective fall basis and (2) summer futu!'es delive!'y with its respec-
tive summer basis. 
Futures prices follow a seasonal pattern. Under normal conditions, 
the futures price pattern at harvest time is weak with a modest price 
rise in December as sales decline from harvest peaks. Du!'ing the 
January-April period, prices are weak again as sales volume picks up 
due to increased producer marketing to meet cash flow needs. During the 
s umme!', the old crop is usually used up and inventories decrease, caus-
ing prices to strengthen (Stasko and Futrell, 1983). 
Bas is patterns can also be seen as seasonal. They are usually wide1 
at harvest time (October-November) . Furthermore, as storage facilities 
empty and transportation carriers are les s busy after a harvest peak, 
bas is gradually narrows into the following summer. 
Basis is primarily us ed to calculate local cash prices (fall and 
summer) in the model. Theoretically, by subtrac ting a basis under a 
specific futures prices delivery month from that futures price, we 
obtain a local cash price for that specific month. Mathematically, 
LCP • FP + Basis 
m m m (III.10) 
1 
Sin ce basis is normally negative, a wide (narrow) basis means that 
the absolute value is high (low) unless otherwise indicated. 
where: 
LCP 
m 
FP m 
Basis 
m 
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local cash price at month 'm'; 
future price at month 'm'; and 
basis under delivery month 'm'. 
This theoretical identity is based upon a set of "normal condi-
tions" of weather, transportation, storage capacity in the area, and 
local demand and supply among others. 
The marketing options considered in this model are (1) July hedge 
for December delivery (pre-harvest hedge); and (2) October-November 
hedge for July delivery (post-harvest hedge). Thus, the local cash 
price in fall is obtained from option (1) and the sununer cash price 
is calculated from option (2) according to the theoretical identity 
in equation 111.10. 
As with the yield data, a price distribution for futures prices 
and basis is needed to acquire a sample from it. However, instead of 
empirically eliciting the price distribution, they (futures prices 
and basis) are assumed to follow a triangular distribution s i milar to 
the one depicted in Figure 111.8. 
A triangular distribution is quick and easy to administer. By 
specifying 3 parameters of the distribution, its mean and variance 
can be calculated exactly. The parameters are a lowest likely (a), a 
most likely (m), and a highest likely (b) value . Thus, 
Mean = (a + m + b)/3 
Variance= [(b - a) 2 + (m - a)(m b)]/18 . 
a 
Minimum 
price 
(basis) 
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m 
Most likely 
price 
(basis) 
b 
Maximum 
price 
(basis) 
Figure III . 8. Triangular probability distribution 
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Although simple to elicit and to work with, triangular distribu-
tions impose a rigid functional form that might cause accur acy to be 
sacrificed. Despite this drawback, it was used to draw futures prices 
and basis samples. 
The first step in drawing the samples is to obtain the parameters 
of the triangular distributions for each of the four price variables 
listed in Table III.l . 
Table III. l. Potential futures prices and basis for northwest Iowa 
in 1984-1985 marketing year: Corna 
Lowest Most Highest Mean Variance 
Variable likely like ly likely a2 µ 
a m b 
$/bu. $/bu. $/bu. 
+1984 fa ll futures 
b 
2 . 65 2.90 3.25 2 . 94 . 014 
+1985 summer futuresc 2 . 85 3 .00 3.40 3.07 .014 
+1984 fall basis -0.52 -0 . 42 -0. 38 -0.44 .0001 
+1985 sunnner basis -0 . 30 -0.25 -0.20 -0 . 245 .0004 
aSource: Robert N. Wisner, Extension Economist , Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa. 
bnecember fu tures placed in July 1984 . 
CJuly 1985 futures placed in October-November 1984. 
S .D . 
a 
. 12 
. 12 
. 03 
. 02 
Given the recent tendency of corn futures prices and basis, the 
values of the variables in Table III.l seem to bound expected prices 
for the 1984-1985 marketing year. The s ubsequent steps include the 
es timation of fall and suimner cash prices displayed in Table III . 2 . 
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Table III.2. Corn potential fall (1984) and summer (1985) local cash 
a prices for northwest Iowa 
Lowest Most Highest Mean Variance S.D. 
Variable likely likely likely a2 a µ 
$/bu. $/bu . $/bu. 
+1984 fall cash price 2 . 13 2.48 2.87 2.50 .014 .12 
+1985 sununer cash price 2.55 2.75 3.20 2 .83 .014 . 12 
aSource: Tab le III. l. 
As a final note on prices, the probability distributions of 
prices and yields are considered independent. Empirical support or 
refutation for this assumption is difficult to obtain since fa rm 
level data are not available. 
In summary, the data sources for corn production costs, crop 
insurance, and the farm feed grain program were established . The pro-
cedure for estimating yield distributions for three farm-level data 
sets was discussed , selecting the Sutherland farm distribution as 
the s upplier of yield data needed in the computer model. Finally, 
the triangular distribution was examined as the one that will generate 
prices and basis data for the marketing options in the model. 
Computer Coding, Operation, Solution Techniques 
and Experimental Techniques 
To this point, a model has been constructed capable of giving a 
result (i.e . , cash flow after consumption) by means of executing a 
series of operations (steps (A), (B), (C), and (D) of Diagram 
III. I) . 
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These operations (including step (E) of Diagram III.l) were re-
written in a computer language called "Business Basic" of the Apple 
III micro-computer. It is an easy language to learn and W<>rk with. 
I n addition, the cost of manipulating the model in a micro- computer is 
essentially null, and, most of all, the needs of the model are suffi-
ciently satisfied by this type of computer. 
The computerized model is operated by vectors of inputs that 
have to be filed on a floppy disk . Each of the five vectors is given 
a different name: yield vector, fall future prices vector , summer 
fut ures prices vector , fall basis and summer basis vectors, and farm 
level data vector. All of them together compound the 38 input vari-
ables of the model (i . e., the farm level data vector contains all 
the information about production costs, insurance, leverage and f a rm 
progr-ams). 
After going th r ough all the calculation s teps, the model's output 
reports the following variables: yield, fall cash price , fall futures 
price, indemnity, gross farm income, taxes, net farm income (NFI), net 
farm income after consumption (NFIAC), and cash flows after consumption 
(CFAC) . 
The model was solved by using simulation techniques . Let us first 
define what simulation is and what steps are followed in a simulation 
experiment . 
Naylor (1971, p . 2) defines simulation as "a numerical technique 
for conducting experiments with certain types of mathematical models 
which describe the behavior of a complex system on a digital 
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computer . . . . " 
An important question should be posed here: why use simulation 
and not any other standard analytical technique (i.e., mathematical 
programming)? With economic systems, frequently it is simply impos-
sible, impractical, or uneconomical to conduct controlled experiments . 
Thus, computer simulation becomes a relevant tool for analyzing 
economic systems. 
Following the definition of computer simulation, experiments 
with this tool usually involve a procedure that consists of these six 
steps (Naylor, 1971) : 
(1) Formulation of the problem; 
(2) Formulation of a mathematical model; 
(3) Formulation of a computer program; 
( 4) Validation ; 
(5) Experimental design; 
(6) Data analysis. 
The first three points have been covered in Chapters I, II, and the 
first part of this chapter. 
Point 4 (validation) is generally referred to as the "goodness 
of fit" of the simulation model. The accuracy of the computer model 
depends heavily upon yield and price distributions. These distribu-
tions were validated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of goodness of 
fit (Ostle et al . , 1975, pp. 489-90) at the .OS level of significance . 
Experimental design (point S) concentrates mainly on the identifi-
cation of endogenous (output) variables and exogenous (input) variables. 
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In s imulat ion experiments , there are never any uncontrolled or un-
observed factors. The role that uncontrolled and unobserved factors 
play in the real world is played in a computer s imulation model by 
the random character of exogenous variables. The i npu t or exogenous 
variables in the computer model are all the variables listed in Ap-
pendix B: chiefly, farm level data, yields, futures prices, and 
basis. Among the input variabl es , some are fixed (no random selection 
process is applied), while some others are generated randomly . A vari-
able is said to be random when it comes from a sample of the popula-
tion distribution ' s "random" variable generator. Yield, futures 
prices , and basis are the random variables in the computer model . 
The output or endogenous variables in the model are taxes , gross and 
net farm incomes, indemnities , and cash flows after consumption . 
Another aspect of experimental design is the selection of ex-
perimental techniques that are suitable for the computer simulation 
experiment . Monte Carlo methods are the techniques employed in the 
generation of yield and prices data. Yield sample is found from the 
estimated negative skewed distribution of the Sutherland farm. Futures 
prices and basis are drawn from a triangular distribution . 1 
The experimental technique used for comparison of prospects is 
1 the stochastic dominance procedures described by Anderson et al. 
(1977, Chapter 9) . 
1The main concern of Monte Carlo r outines is to obtain a respect-
ably small standard error in the final resort (generated random values) . 
This is done by a sophisticated procedure of random number manipula-
tions (Hammersley and Handscomb (1964). 
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Stochastic dominance allows the ranking of probability distri-
butions for different classes of risk attitudes. This techniq ue 
focuses directly on the estimated probability distributions of out-
comes (CFAC in our case) . It is described as f irst- , second- , and 
third-degree stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Meyer, 
1977). First-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) holds between two 
distributions if cumulative distribution of one is equal to or 
greater than the other . Second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD), a 
weaker condition than FSD, holds whenever the integral of one cumula-
tive distribution is equal to or greater than the integral of the 
other . Third-degree stochastic dominance (TSD) holds in the second 
integral if one cumulative distribution is equal to or greater than 
the second integral of the other. TSD is weaker than SSD . 
For the purpose of the empirical model , only FSD and SSD are 
considered. Cumulative distributions are generated for each pr ospect 
t o be evaluated in step (E) of Diagram 111.1. Such cumulative 
distributions of CFAC are drawn from samples of 100 observations for 
yield and prices functions. As a consequence, the samples of yield 
and prices remain the same for each prospect. In other words, t he 
samples become endogenous to the model, even though they are randomly 
generated. The objective of this is t o have compatible prospects . 
After the experimental design, the next step i s to obtain empirical 
1 
An extensive bibliography on stochastic dominance can be found 
in Bawa (1981). 
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results of the endogenous variables in the model in order to analyze 
the model's precision and implications of the results, as discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV . ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Chapter III established the procedures for estimating farm in-
comes under different management strategies. This chapte r goes 
into the estimation of some of the many possible ways crop insur-
ance, federal farm programs, and marketing can be combined in a risk 
management framework . The risk management options used to generate 
each prospect are explained in detail. In addition, average compari-
sons of cash flows after consumption are made among prospects. This 
serves as the background of a more formal analysis of stochastic 
dominance procedures, which will be presented and discussed later in 
the chapter . 
General Considerations 
In orde r to generate prospects, the following assumptions are made: 
(1) The analysis is concentrated on a 400-acre farm where no crop rota-
tion is practiced; specifically, the farmer plants corn following 
corn . 
(2) Yield, futures prices, cash prices, and basis vectors are all held 
constant for each generated prospect. 
(3) Pre-harvest cost per acre and harvest cost per bushel are also 
held constant throughout the analysis. 
(4) Io the case of insurance, it is assumed that all planted acres are 
insured. 
Table IV . l has a sununary of the variables and their specific values 
used to generate prospects. For instance, three leverage positions, four 
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insurance alternatives, two mar keting options, and two farm programs are 
the group of variables used to run the model. 
Table IV . 2 shows how each group of variables was combined to 
arrive at t he 22 final prospects. For example , using Table IV . l in 
Table IV. 2. Risk management strategies considered in prospect analysis 
Prospect Leverage Insurance Marketing Farm program 
Plan 
1 I I 
2 II I 
3 III I 
4 I I I 
5 I II I 
6 I III I 
7 I IV I 
8 I II 
9 I I I 
10 I I II 
11 I I II 
12 I II II 
13 I II I 
14 I II II 
15 I I I I 
16 I II I I 
17 I I I II 
18 I II I II 
19 I I II I 
20 I II II I 
21 I I II II 
22 I II II II 
combination with Table IV.2, it can be read that prospect 1 has leverage 
equal to .5 and 30% fall and 70% summer direct cash sale (no hedge) as a 
marke ting option. Insurance and farm programs are not considered in 
prospect 1. 
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The analysis is concentrated on the following aspects: average 
cash flow (ACF), its standard deviation, effects on taxes, the proba-
bility of negative cash flows, and how the distribution of cash flows is 
altered. These aspects are summarized in Table IV .4, which is used for 
reference throughout the analysis. 
Prospect Estimation: General Analysis 
Leverage J!&L 
Prospects 1, 2 and 3 represent three kinds of farms. The first is a 
non-leveraged farm (LE = 0, prospect #]) on which debt amounts to zero . 
A second type of farm, in which the debt/equity ratio is .5, represents 
a middle-leveraged farm (prospect #1). Prospect #3 represents a 
high-leveraged farm with a level equal to 1, which is equivalent to 50 
percent of farm equity. 
From Table IV.4, it can be seen that as the non-farm equity/farm 
equi ty ratio increases, average cash flow decreases and becomes nega-
tive at .5 and 1 levels (-1,397, and -13,319, respectively). On the 
other hand, deviation from the mean spreads out as leverage increases . 
Looking to the lower- and upper-bound (observations 1 and 100) sug-
gests the impact of a higher leverage on cash flow increases at a de-
creasing rate when a low yield occurs. For instances , the differences 
of the lower values of prospects 1 and 3 can be compared with prospect 
2 where LE = O. One way of explaining this decreasing impact is that 
as leverage level doubles, non-farm equity increases less than double, 
as is the case between prospects 1 and 3. 
On the other hand, as yield per acre increases, the cost of borrowed 
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capital per bushel decreases. This has the effect of narrowing the 
gap among leverage levels, for example, in terms of prospect 2 ' s 
upper value, prospect l's value is . 71, and prospect J 's is .57 of 
that value . In contrast , these l evels a r e magnified when comparing 
lowe r-bo~d values--if prospect 2 is equal to -1 (because of negative 
figures) , prospect 1 is equal to -1 .74, and prospect 3 is equal to 
-2.11. This suggests (1) farm risk increases as the leverage l evel in-
cr eases , (2) given certain yield and price distributions, a higher 
leveraged farm is more susceptible (prone) to lower cash flows than a 
less leveraged farm , and (3) the capaci t y of bearing risk is decreasing-
ly reduced as the farm relies more and more on borrowed capital. 
Consider how the farm uses borrowed capital as a means of farm in-
vestments . Thus, leverage effects on equity r eturns can be viewed in 
the fol lowing exampl e . Assume four rates of return on total capital 
and a 12% interest rate (Table IV.3); as the rate of return goes 
Table IV.3 . Leverage impacts on equity 
Re turn on 
total capital 0 
Debt to asset ratio 
.5 1 
~~% return to equity (12% interest rate)~~~~-
15% 
10% 
5% 
-5% 
15% 
10 
5 
- 5 
17.0% 
9. 0% 
1.5 
-13.5 
18% 
8 
-2 
-22 
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Table IV.4. Cash flows from risk management strategies 
Average cash Standard 
Cash flow 
Strategies Prospect 
flow (ACF) deviation Lower Upper 
bound bound 
($) ($) ($) ($) 
Leverage 1 - 1397 23480 -70476 31703 
2 18657 18529 -40476 44432 
3 -13319 25569 -854 76 25145 
Insurance 4 3027 11027 -17982 30549 
5 3482 10510 -15552 30549 
6 -150 19324 -43150 31433 
7 6 18989 -41950 31433 
Marketing 8 - 3058 23230 -70423 31849 
Farm programs 9 909 20828 -60275 32871 
10 7371 10432 -22921 25765 
Combined 11 1261 1099 -16466 30695 
12 1716 10517 -16314 30695 
13 -677 20807 -6022 7 32998 
14 6097 10582 22826 25877 
15 4930 965 7 -13291 31850 
16 5319 9232 -11104 31850 
17 9258 5067 280 25090 
18 9418 4900 1164 25090 
19 3257 10169 -16646 31982 
20 3648 9798 -16646 31982 
21 7992 5481 -2251 25203 
22 8155 5340 -2251 25203 
up the return to equity of higher leverage is above the non-leverage. 
On the contrary, as the rate of return goes down, the return of 1:1 
asset to debt ratio will go down more sharply than the no debt posi-
tion. This explains, in part, point 1 of the above paragraph. 
For purposes of simplicity and concentration, for the analysis on 
insurance, marketing, and impact of farm programs (prospects 4 through 
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22) , a f urther assumptio~ has been made : 
(5) A singl e farm leverage position is considered in the remaining 
prospects . The l ever age level is assumed to be . 5 .
1 
Federal crop insurance (FCI) 2 
Prospects 4 through 7 picture four different insurance poli cies . 
Prospect 4 has a maximum protection against crop losses . It is 75 per-
cent of the Area Average Yield (AAY) as guaranteed yield and a price 
l evel of $2 .70 per bushe l. Prospect 5 uses the Individual Yield Plan 
(IYP) option of FCI instead of using the AAY to cal culate guaranteed 
bushel s . The modal value of the historical yield data of Sutherland 
farm was used fo r this purpose. This value is 121 bu/Ac , which is only 
3 bushels above the AAY; however , this small gap s hould be enough to 
tell the direction of the impact on cash flows by introducing IYP . 
Premium rates are not a ltered under IYP. Finally , pr ospects 6 and 7 
represent the lowest protection l evel s of FCI using AAY and IYP , re -
spectively . 
In general , aver age cash flows are improved under insurance 
prospects . The larger improvements are on prospect s with high protection 
levels. Specifically , prospect 5 , which considers IYP, is the one that 
resulted in the biggest boost in cash flow. Between prospects with low 
1 Indeed, a leverage level of 1 or 0 could be used instead of . 5 since 
its impact on other risk strategies is only in absolute terms, although 
a highl y leveraged farm would be more willing to purchase insurance and/or 
participate in farm programs because of the extra r isk put into the farm 
operation by borrowed capital . 
2see Appendix A for an explanati on of FCI components . 
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protection, prospect 7, which again makes use of IYP, proved to be be tter 
in average than AAY prospect 6 (see Table IV.4) . 
From another perspective, FCI does pay an indemnity about 1 out of 
5 times on high protection levels and 1 out of 8 times on low protection 
(Table IV . 5). Furthermore, average indemnities seem to be greater than 
premium costs . In fact, $2 . 11 is received as indemnity per each dollar 
paid as premium in prospect 5. This figure is $2.39 for prospect 7. 
Table IV . 5 summarizes these and other figures . Here , it is good t o note 
that total premium costs remain unchanged within the 75 and 50 percent 
coverage levels . One would expect that by increasing the number of 
bushels guaranteed and at the s ame time holding premium rates constant , 
the insurance policy would be sounder and more at tractive than it would 
be otherwise. 
Moreover, any indemnity received i s subject to taxes , and any premi-
um paid is deductible f rom it . On the average, taxes a re slightly modi-
fied under insurance prospects . Switching from any AAY to IYP has a 
negligible impac t on taxes. 
For the purpose of illustra tion, Table IV.6 shows t en possible cash 
f l ows with and without FCI . Ten yield values were picked from the sample 
of 100 observations. By studying the distributions in each column, i t 
i s clear that cash flows are improved at low yields with i ns urance. 
Finally, it seems logi cal to expect a l ower chance of negative in-
come with high protection l evels than low protection levels . However, the 
100 observations drawn for this s tudy show the opposit e . Under the 75 
percent guaranteed yield level, negative cash f lows occurred 43 times . 
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This occurred 38 times under the 50 percent protection l evel. A closer 
look at these prospects ought to explain the controve rsy . Either the 
premium paid at the 50 percent level is too low or the premium at the 
75 percent level is too high compared to the coverage received . Thus, 
CFAC around zero are sensitive to them. 
Under IYP , of the 22 times that FCI paid an indemnity with the 75 
percent level , 13 of them were also covered by the 50 percent level . 
Moreover, 4 (of the 22) observations had fewer than 4 bushels be low the 
guaranteed yield of 90. 75 bu/Ac. 1 This suggests that the 75 percent 
protection level was not enough to turn cash flows from red to black ink. 
Neither does it overcome the 50 percent level in regard to negative in-
comes. It was fo und , in connection with coverage l evels , that while the 
protection level is raised 50 percent when going from the 50 percent 
level to the 75 percent level, the total premium paid went up 300% . Part 
of this faster increase in premium paid is justified by the increasing 
chances of a yield between 50 and 75 percent levels and by the higher in-
demnity to be paid for a l oss covered by the 75 percent level . Neverthe-
less, it seems to be a sharp increase in premiums. In per acre terms, an 
additional premium of $6 . 21 is paid when moving from the 50 to the 75 
percent level. 
Marketing 
Switching to marketing strategies , it is well-known that selling and 
buying futures contracts is a tool (usually called hedging) widely used 
1 
With indemnities lower than premium paid. 
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among farmers . Its main goal is to offset some risk of the price vari-
ability in the cash market. 
A post-harvest hedge (or storage hedge) operation is pictured in 
prospect 8. In this prospect, 30 percent of the total corn production is 
sold in the fall in order to meet some cash flow expenses due at harvest 
time. The remaining 70 percent is hedged for July delivery (9 months af-
ter harvest). At maturity time, a July futures contract is bought back to 
offset the former contract. The gain or loss by hedging is reflected on CFAC. 
Some important aspects of hedging need to be stated before de-
tailing the marketing prospect. Table IV.7 contains the boundaries 
Table IV . 7. Potential futures prices and basis fo r corn in northwest 
Iowa ($/bu) (1984-85) 
Lowest likely 
Most likely 
Highest likely 
(1) 
July 1985 
futures in 
Oct .-Nov. 
1984 
2. 85 
3. 00 
3.40 
(2) 
Basis under 
July 1985 
delivery 
. 30 
. 25 
.20 
Average 
(3) 
Local hedge 
price 
3 .ooa - (2) 
2.70 
2.75 
2.80 
2 . 75 
(4) 
Local cash 
price 
(1) - (2) 
2 . 55 
2 .75 
3 .20 
2.83 
aThis value is the hedging price assumed for selling futures con-
tracts at harvest time . It is also the most likely parameter of 
July 1985 f utures prices. 
of potential futures prices and basis for corn in northwest Iowa. 
Local hedge prices (LHP) were obtained by subtracting potential 
basis from an expected July futures price of $3 . 00/bu., which is the 
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most likely value of potential fut ures prices distribution. Similarly, 
local cash price (LCP) was calculated by using the potential July 
futures prices distribution instead of its expected value. 
On the average, LCP has a mean $ . 08 higher than LHP. Thus, it 
might appear that cash sales are better than storage-hedge . However, a 
c lose look at the range of prices in both alternatives indicates that LCP 
varies $ . 65 while LHP only varies $.10. This can be considered in 
terms of the risk on price variability and how much of it can be 
afforded . Unfortunately, there is no "free lunch" ; with hedging, a 
higher income is sacrificed in return for some income stability. 
As a r esult , ACF is lower with hedge than without it (prospects 8 
and 1) . The reason for this can be found in the distribution of July 
fut ures prices; for instance, a fu tures contract was bought back at a 
higher price than the selling July futures price of $3.00 more than 
60 percent of the time. Thus, because cash flows went down with hedg-
ing, average taxes paid also went down. Finally, in looking for a 
break-even price between hedge and no-hedge, a price of $3 . 10 was found 
to be the expected futures price which would achieve it, providing 
futures and basis distributions remain the same. 
Federal farm programs (FFP) 
Two types of FFP plans were considered here : a paid diversion 
program plus a set-aside program with eligibility for price support 
loans. The second plan is eq ual to the first one plus an extra acreage 
reduction placed under the Payment-In-Kind Program (PIK) . 
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Prospect 9 has a 10 percent land paid dive rsion at a rate of $1.50 
per bushel. The yield from O'Brien County is used to calculate direct 
payment per acre. The land diversion allows for a short term loan (price 
support loan) of $2.65 per bushel harvested . In prospect 10, PIK par-
ticipation requires an extra 10 percent of unpaid land diversion and an 
additional 30 percent diversion from which the farmer will receive at 
harvest 80 percent of ASCS county yield in kind per each PIK acre. How-
ever, PIK grain is not loan eligible. 
Participation in FFP reduces income variability by truncating low 
incomes to a certain minimum and high incomes to a maximum. For in 
s tance, compare the lower and higher bounds of prospect 1 (no participa-
tion) with those of 9 and 10. In terms of mean values, prospect 9 has 
a higher mean than prospect 1 ($909 against $-1397) and lower S. D. 
(20828 against 23480, respective l y) . It suggests that, in this case, 
participation is preferable to non-participation in a mean standard 
deviation discussion. This statement is reinforced by PIK participation 
(prospect 10) , which accounts for an average improvement of $10,000 in 
cash flows and an additional reduction of $10,000 in the S.D . (see Table 
IV.4). 
Moreover , negative cash flows occur in 27 instances out of the 100 
observations of prospect 9 . Under prospect 10, they occur only 14 
times. This is reflected in the differences between ACF and S.D. of 
both prospects. 
In general, FFP seems to perform fairly well with low yields and/or 
low corn prices. On the other hand, they seem to put a top on high 
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income when high yield and/or high prices exist . Here , the opportunity 
cost of non-planting a portion of the crop land goes from negative (with 
l ow yields) to a positive value (with high yields). 
Finally , FFP participation has a slight effect on taxes compared 
to the improved cash f l ows. With paid diversion and loan programs, 
taxes paid increased (on average) $.17 per each extra dollar of gain. 
With PIK , the extra tax paid was only $ . 08 per dollar . 
Combined strategies 
So fa r, we have analy zed alternatives wher e either FCI or marketing 
or FFP options have been used . This section examines new prospects 
where interaction o f op t ions is allowed. These a r e p rospects 11 to 22 
of Table IV.2 . 
The reason for this set of prospects is to dig more into the impact 
of marketing and FFP strategies on t he desirability of crop insurance . 
Table IV . 4 is again used for reference. In brief , it will be seen that 
the effect on cash flows by mixed options is similar to the sum of the 
separate impact of those mixed alternatives . However, distributions of 
cash f l ows are somewhat altered . 
While FCI is used to reduce risk in production , marketing tools such 
as post-har vest hedge reduce the risk in crop prices. Prospects 11 and 
12 combine these alternatives. Major impacts are on taxes paid and 
deviations from the mean which become diminished. 
Pr ospects 13 and 14 merge marketing and FFP options . Under the 
former prospect, ACF i s lower than ACF under either a lternative alone . 
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Here, post-hedge has a negative impac t on FFP . because of the losses 
experienced ln the futures market. Less taxes are then paid and 
the chances of negative outcomes increase from 27 to 35 percent 
(prospects 9 and 13, respectively ). Prospect 14 (compared to prospect 
10) gives a similar picture to that in prospect 13, the only differ-
ence being negative incomes, which rise from 14 times in prospect 10 
to 18 under prospect 14 . 
FCI and FFP are combined in prospects 15, 16, 17 and 18. In 15 
and 16, only 360 acres were insured because 10 percent of the 400 
acreage base was set aside in farm programs. With PIK participation, 
acres insured were further reduced to 200. Thus, the importance of 
crop insurance as a tool to bear production risk is diminished by FFP 
enrollment, especially with PIK participation. 
FFP insures, on the average, a minimum return per acre by reducing 
possible losses when putting acres out of production and taking 
advantage of the price support loan to increase sale revenues. 
Under these prospects, ACF and its standard deviation are improved. 
Minimum cash flows are raised and maximum levels are limited by the 
cost of insurance and the opportunity cost of set-aside acres when 
high yields occur . It is worth noting that negative incomes are out 
of the map in prospects 17 and 18. Here, both FCI and FFP performed 
very efficiently with low yields. Finally, taxes paid are boosted 
because of improved incomes (Table IV.4) . 
Prospects 19, 20, 21 and 22 are the last to be studied . Here, 
post-hedge, FCI and FFP are all combined. In brief, the results 
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of these prospects are similar to prospec t s 15, 16, 17 and 18 , respec-
tively . The majo r change is due t o the hedge option which was analyzed 
earlier . 
To s ummarize the pros pects r eviewed, 
(1) Given a farm size, alternative leverage positions alte r 
the range of cash flows . 
(2) FCI is effecti ve on the lower portion of cash flow distribu-
tions by trunca ting the chances of big l osses usually related 
to low yields . 
(3) Post-har ves t hedge did not take a predominant position over 
FCI mainly because of poor performance of hedging decisions 
in the model. 
(4) Farm pr ograms s how them to be a close competitor of insurance, 
mainly when the PIK program was considered. 
Some insight has been gained with this general analys is of 
prospects, fulfilling its purpose of clarifying the understanding and 
discussion of pr ospects ' merits prior to a more r igorous procedure of 
analysis as presented in the next section. 
Pr ospect Evaluation: Stochasti c Dominance Approach 
The motivation for using s t ochasti c dominance comes from its 
access ibility for discr e t e choice effi ciency ana lys is. The principles 
of fi rst- and second-degree stochastic dominance--FSD , and SSD, r espec-
tively--are considered in the s imulation model as follows . 
FSD: The pr obability function f(x) of prospect "A" is said to 
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dominate the probability function g(x) of prospect "B" by FSD if, 
and only if F1 (R) ~ G1 (R) for a ll values of Rc [a,b] with strict in-
equali t y for at least one value of Rc [a,b]; F1 (R) and G1 (R) are the 
cumulative density functions (CDF) of prospects " A" and "B" in ques-· 
tion, respectively . Any intersection of CDFs will mean the prospects 
involved are both efficient in FSD. 
The reasonable assumption behind FSD comes from the basic idea 
that if x is the unscaled measure of consequence such as profit (or 
cash flows in our model), decision makers always prefer more to less 
of x. 
SSD: The probability function f(x) is said to dominate the proba-
bility function g(x) by SSD if, aud only if, F2 (R) ~ c2(R) for all 
values of Rc[a,b] with strict inequality for at least one value of 
Rc [a,b]. F2 (R) and G2 (R) are the SSD cumulative for the F1 (R) and 
c1 (R) cumulatives of FSD. Again, to assess efficiency in SSD, we need 
to ens ure that the SSD cumulatives of F
2
(R) and c2 (R) of prospect "A" 
and "B" do not cross at any point of the SSD distributions. 
The graphs presented in this section do not show SSD cumulatives 
of the prospects involved. A mathematical computer subroutine was built 
into the computer model to solve SSD. This subroutine is for the dis-
c r e te case of SSD presented in Anderson et al. (1977). 
The assumption in SSD is that, in addition to the FSD's assumption, 
the decision maker is averse to risk. No specific measure of risk aver-
sion is assessed in SSD. In terms of the utility function , the pre-
sumption is that the function is not only monotonically increasing 
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(FSD assumption ) , but also strictly concave. Thus, risk neutral or 
risk prone individuals are automatically out of the analysis. 
Note that CDF (cumulative density function), distribution, or 
prospect are all used interchangeably when referring to the cumulative 
density distr ibution of cash flows of a prospect. The analysis is 
done in pairwise comparison of the relevant prospect dealing with 
c r op insurance, and the two leverage prospects that are first dis-
cussed. All figures have cash flows after consumption (CFAC) on 
the horizontal axis and cumulative probability on the vertical axis . 
A pairwise comparison of a nonleverage farm and a leveraged farm 
is depicted in Figure IV.l (prospects 2 and 1 of Table IV.4), clearly 
showing that the nonleveraged's CDF (broken line) is completely below 
the leveraged ' s CDF (unbroken line). This result is as was expected, 
since as the debt to equity ratio incr eases, the leveraged 's CDF moves 
farther left relative to the nonleveraged's CDF. The shift is not 
parallel because less taxes are paid at higher leverage. But the 
essence of leverage is related to the probability and relat i ve impact 
on owned capital by the two leveraged CDFs of Figure IV.l. 
For instance, using the information of prospects 1 and 2, a 
$-30 ,000 CFAC means a 7.5% loss on equity capital for the .5 leveraged 
farm (prospect 1) and only a 5% loss for the zero leveraged farm 
(prospect 2) . However, the probability of $-30,000 or less is about 
18% for the .5 leverage position and only 4% for the nonleveraged 
position . On the other hand, a CFAC of $30,000 is e quivalent to a 
7.5% gain on equity capital for the .5 leveraged farm and a 5% gain 
t.
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for the nonleveraged farm. Thus, a farmer's ability to bear the in-
crease in income variability caused by leverage may influence prefer-
ences for other risk-sharing options . 
One way of preventing the associated risk with leverage (other 
than not borrowing capital) is to reduce as much as possible the 
chances of rates of returns below the capital cost rate. The purchase 
of crop insurance will ensure a minimum return to the leveraged farm 
and some security to lenders. Figure IV.2 shows the CDFs of CFAC 
for the IYP prospect 5 of crop insurance (broken line) and the .5 
leveraged farm prospect (unbroken line). 
In Figure IV . 2 , the insurance prospect truncates the lower tail 
of the CDF (usually related to low yields) significantly. The gap 
between insurance and no-insurance CDFs is sharply reduced as we move 
up along the distributions. The crossing point A means that the 
amount of indemnity received is equal to the amount of premium paid, 
and it is equivalent to the no-insurance outcome at that point. After 
point A the insurance prospect does not pay any indemnity, and it 
only brings an absolute cost equal to the premium, although it domi-
nates the no-insurance prospect i n SSD. It implies that a rational 
risk averter whose utility function is represented by the sample CDFs 
of Figure IV.2 should reduce the risk he/she bears by purchasing c rop 
insurance. 
The leverage distribution in Figure IV.2 is plotted again in 
Figure IV.3 against the marketing prospect (discontinuous line). 
This picture clearly shows that the marketing option selected in 
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the model had a poor performance in boosting cash flows through r e-
ducing price variability. From this graph, it can be concluded 
that leverage distribution dominates the marketing distribution by 
FSD . 
On the contrary, farm programs dominate the leverage distribution 
in SSD criteria. Farm programs do bring real increments of cash flows 
in almost a l l paths of the distribution, as depicted in Figure IV.4 . 
Such increments are wider when PIK is included in the farm program 
distribution , as is seen in Figure IV.5. However, the possibility of 
very high incomes is sacrificed when the opportunity cost of diverted 
land tur ns out to be higher than actually planting those acres. This 
is s hown by the uppe r part of the distribution of Figure IV . 5 . Over-
all, SSD is exerted by PIK distribution over the leveraged one. 
From this point , all pairwise comparisons will observe the effi-
ciency and desirabili ty of FCI as a risk management tool. The analy-
sis is made with the help of graphs which will facilitate the presenta-
tion. Again, words such as CDF, prospect, or distribution are used 
interchangeably to refer to cumulative distributions of CFAC . Fur ther-
more, a leverage level of .5 is used in all prospects as a fixed 
financial position. 
Insur ance prospects are depicted in Figure IV.6 . The continuous 
line is AAY prospect 4 of Table IV . 4. The broken line corresponds 
to the IYP prospect 5. Since the guaranteed bushe ls have been 
r aised with the I YP option, the AAY prospect lies above the IYP 
prospect on the lower portion of the CDFs . Then, they merge at point 
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A and from there on they form a single solid line . FSD by the IYP's 
CDF over the AAY ' s CDF is evident . 
If there is a FSD between two high insurance protection level 
prospects, the same might be expected to happe n between a high and 
low protection level. Certainly it is not the case with prospect 5 
(75 percent protection) and prospect 7 (50 percent protection), as 
is shown in Figure IV . 7 . Although prospect 5 (unbroken line) domi-
nates the lower 1/4 of prospect 7 ' s CDF (broken line) , the signs are 
reversed in the upper 3/4 of the distributions . However, prospect 
S's CDF does dominate prospect 7 ' s CDF in SSD (area A is greater than 
area B). 
Thus, Figures IV.6 and IV.7 indicate that IYP at 75 percent 
coverage level is stochastically the efficient insurance option among 
the insurance alternatives analyzed. Prospect 5 contains this effi-
cient option . 
Once an efficient insurance prospect is established , it can be 
compa red against prospects with alternative risk strategies. The 
pairwise comparisons to be discussed are insurance--marketing, 
insurance--farm programs, and insurance--marketing and farm programs. 
Figure IV.8 depicts the insurance and marketing distributions . 
The performance of insurance significantly offse ts the marketing 
(post-hedge) option in regard to the lower portion of both distribu-
tions. Insurance distribution brings a higher mean (expected value) 
of CFAC with a lower variance than marketing distribution . However, 
in regard to the upper 3/4 of the distributions, no clear domination 
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is seen by either prospect. Overall, SSD is exerted by the insurance 
distribution over the marketing distribution. 
Between crop insurance and farm programs , there are two diffe rent 
pictures. The fir s t one is plotted in Figure IV.9. The broken line 
refe rs to prospect 9 (no PIK) of Table IV.4. As with the marketing 
distribution, insurance's CDF (unbroken line) dominates farm programs 
distribution in SSD . However, it is clear from the picture that the 
farm programs ' CDF does reduce the gap between it and insurance's CDF 
when no farm program is considered (i.e., compare the lower tails of 
distributions in Figures IV . 9 and IV.l). Some of the gain brought by 
insurance (area A of Figure IV.9) is at the expense of foregoing some 
gain with farm programs (area Bin the same figure). Thus, it might 
be the case that in a wide range of risk averse farmers (i . e., low to 
high), some might prefer insurance and some others might prefer farm 
programs . 
A decision between farm programs or insurance is made more simply 
when the PIK program is included in the farm programs (prospect 10 of 
Table IV.4) . Figure IV.10 depicts such a situation. Farm programs 
with PIK {broken line ) simulate the insurance distribution (continu-
ous l ine) in regard to low yields (where the effectiveness of insur-
ance is attributed) which corresponds to low cash flows . It is 
clearly seen by the narrowed area A in the figure . On the other 
hand , benefits from PIK participation expand the differences between 
it and insurance as can be seen by the area B in Figure IV . 10. This 
area shows that PIK's CDF accumulates higher gains than insurance in 
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more than 50 percent of the distributions. Howeve r, surprisingly 
enough, SSD is not shown by either prospect . This means that both 
prospects are e ffi cient in a second degree sense. The s ource of 
the ambiguity is i n th e upper 10 fractile (.90-1.00) of the distri-
butions . PIK dis tribution stops accumulating cash flows before in-
s urance ' s CDF does . A third or higher degree of stochastic effi-
ciency needs to be stated. This i s beyond the scope of this s tudy. 
All tha t can be said he re is that PIK and insurance prospects are 
both in the efficient set of second degree dominance . 
Finally, the added impacts of marketing and fann programs on the 
desirability of insurance are pictured in Figure I V.11. A farm pro-
gram (without PIK) and a post-harvest hedge form both the discon-
tinuous l i ne in the figure (prospect 13 in Table IV.4). The insur-
ance prospect (continuous line) dominates in SSD . This is simply the 
re flection of what was seen in Figure IV.9, where only farm pro-
grams were conside red. Again, marketing shifts the farm programs ' 
CDF to the left, making i nsurance ' s CDF more attractive than before. 
Table IV . 8 s ummarizes the stochastic anal ysis done among prospects . 
Leverage di stribution is clearly dominated by nonleve rage dis tribution 
and risk management distributions except for marketing (prospect 8), 
which is dominate d by the former . Among insurance alternatives, IYP 
option of federal crop insurance seems to perform better than the AAY 
option. I nsurance dominates marketing and farm programs without PIK. 
It i s a s e fficient as fa rm programs with PIK, as seen in Table IV.8 
(prospect 5 against prospect 10). 
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Table IV.8 . Stochastic dominance results of 9 risk management 
a prospects 
Prospect 
1 
4 
5 
2 4 
1 
-1 
5 
2 
1 
7 
2 
8 9 10 
-1 2 2 
2 2 0 
a 
See Table IV . 2 for a desc ription of these prospects: 
13 
2 
"-" means no comparison has been done b/w. row and column prospect. 
"-1" - row prospect dominates column prospect in FSD. 
"O" - no domination by either prospect in SSD. 
" l " - row prospect is dominated by column prospect in FSD. 
"2" - row prospect is dominated by column prospect in SSD. 
"-2" - row prospect dominates column prospect in SSD. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Parti cipa tion by farmers in the Federal All-Ris k Crop Insurance 
program (FCI) has been rathe r low. Farmers' pe r ception of risk or 
their ability to bear it may make FCI unnecessary . Moreove r, it 
is possible that premiums and/or coverage l evels do not ac curately 
reflect the probabilities of crop fai lures . I n addition , other risk 
control instruments may compete with FCI . 
To cope with the probl em, the performance of FCI was contrasted to 
the pe rfo rmance of farm commodity progr am partici pation and marketing al-
ternatives i n a single- period Monte Carlo s i mulation mode l. Also, fa rm 
leverage was manipulated in the simulation model to meas ure the ability of 
produce rs to bear risk and to discover inte rference with FCI and the 
other strategies. The evalua tion criteria used in the model we r e cash 
flows afte r truces and consumption f rom the production of corn. 
A key element in the simulation model was t he estimat ed yield 
distribution f r om which yields were drawn to ca l culate cash flows 
under the different alternatives . Rather t han assuming normality in 
the yield distribution, t ime series yield data f r om experimental 
farms in Iowa were used. The r esult was a left-skewed (long left 
tail) yield distribution that gives lower probabilitie s to low yields 
than a normal yi e ld distribution . Thus , cash flow dist ribution under 
each str ategy is sensitive to the assumed yield distribution. Further, 
another less relevant element in the model was the distrib ution of 
market prices. For its facility in manipulation , a triangular price 
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distribution was assumed, though it may have a serious impact on the 
marketing performance . 
After estimating cash flows distributions under each strategy and 
combinations of them, first- and second-degree concepts of stochastic 
dominance were used to compare the risk-reducing effects of the 
strategies. Focusing on FCI performance relative to and in combination 
with farm programs and marketing tools, the results show that FCI is an 
efficient strategy at high coverage and price levels (75 percent and 
$2.70/bu, respectively) . Its efficiency increases even more when higher 
bushels can be guaranteed, i.e., an individual yield plan of FCI pro~rarn. 
Compared to farm programs, FCI performed better in boosting 
cash flows related to yields below the guaranteed level . Thereafter, 
the performance of farm programs was more efficient than FCI's. More-
over, when payment-in- kind is included in farm programs, the results 
show that FCI and farm programs have equal relative pe rformance in farm 
cash flows. 
Similarly, FCI performed better than the hedge option of marketing 
at low (and eventually negative) cash flows. However, their performance 
is practically the same on t he positive domain of cash flows. 
Finally, the performance of FCI remains the same when compared 
with the combination of FCI and/or farm programs and/or marketing 
options . In other words, the impact of combined strategies on cash 
flows is equivalent to the sum of the impact of individual strategies . 
From the results of this study, FCI can be viewed as an attractive 
option for managing crop production risks. However, its risk-reducing 
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and return (i.e., indenmities) performances are influenced by such 
facto rs as the yie ld distribution and its probabilities of low yields ; 
t he probability that average yield per insured acres falls below the 
yield guaran teed per acre ; and the relation of indennities received to 
premiums paid as a measure of insurance return. 
A major setback of FCI is that it does not guarantee a profit 
either on lost production or on harves ted bushels . This is where fa rm 
programs and marketing instruments may influence the performance of FCI 
in the risk management system. On one hand, farm programs provide a 
minimum price for all harvested bushels in case the market cash price 
is below the minimum. FCI provides a price usually below the cash 
price and only on bushels below the guaranteed yie ld. On the other 
hand, marketing op tions play a more direct role on price risk than farm 
programs by reducing price risk variability even more . 
From another angle, FCI performance is also influenced by the farm 
l everage position which is a measure of risk-bearing ability. Besides 
the opportunity for expanding farm operations, a higher leverage posi-
tion requires a higher rate of returns to capital. An insufficient re-
turn on capital caused by a crop failure may make FCI more attractive 
than it would be otherwise. Thus, it is likely that a farmer ' s ability 
to bear a production failure declines as leverage increases, causing FCI 
to have a better performance in the model. 
Why don't farmers buy FCI? From this study, it can be said that 
FCI only protects against production risk and that production risk is on-
l y a portion (perhaps small, perhaps large) of the t otal farm operation 
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ris k. In addition, an intuition derived from the study suggests 
that price risk may play a more important role in the farm risk 
exposure and with higher probabilities of adverse impact on farm 
returns than FCI's role. However, this partial answer should be 
limited to the study ' s considerations. 
It is hoped that this study will serve to increase the understand-
ing of the role of crop insurance in managing risk. However, due to the 
study's characteristics, it is difficult to extrapolate the results to 
other farm settings or even to state- or nation-wide validation . 
Further research might involve estimation of yield distributions on 
different geographical areas of the country. It would be of interest 
to study the performance over time of FCI and other alternatives to it . 
Finally, more research on farmers' risk perceptions might increase our 
understanding of farmers' decisions under risk . 
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APPENDIX A. FEDERAL ALL-RISK CROP INSURANCE BASICS 
AS AMENDED ON OCTOBER 1 , 1980 
Under FCI , crops are insured against essentially all unavoidable 
causes such as drought, lightning, hail, excess moisture, frost, 
excessive rain, hurricane, wind, insect infestation, tornado, flood, 
winter kill, snow, disease, fire, earthquake, wild life and such other 
unavoidable causes. Plant coverage is not provided against losses due 
to theft and neglect or failur e to fo llow established good farming 
practices . Nor does it cover financial losses resulting from low 
prices received for farm products. Furthermore, insurance is not pro-
vided on any agricultural commodity in any county in which the FCIC 
determines that the income from such commodity cons t itutes an unim-
portant part of the total agricultural income of the county . 
Levels 
Producers can purchase insurance with widely different yield and 
price provisions. Yields may be guaranteed at 50, 65 or 75 percent of 
the appraised average yield for the crop and county in question. County 
yields are computed by the USDA's Statistical Reporting Service (SRS) and 
used by the FCIC . A producer can also choose from three price levels 
established each year by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to provide 
different levels of return if a loss occurs . One of the price elec-
tions offered shall approximate (but be no less than 90 percent of) the 
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1 projected market price for the commodity involved. In addition, pro-
ducers may elect to have deleted from the FCIC ' s policy of insurance 
the coverage against losses caused by hail and fi r e , and this in turn 
is reflected in the premium. However, if fire and hail insurance are 
not purchased through FCIC, proof must be submitted that, at least, 
an equivalent amount of coverage is being carried with another insur-
ance company. 
Premiums 
In each county, premiums are based on actuarial data to reflect dif-
ferences in soil types, historical pattern of crop loss due to cove red in-
s urance factors . and crop yields. Land in each county is classified into 
se veral categories to establish expected normal yields. The normal 
yie ld as established by the FCIC reflects yield r ecords for designated 
areas over the more recent ten years on which records have been as-
sembled . It is not the farm "normal" yield used in government price 
s upport a nd acreage r eduction programs. 
For the purpose of encouraging the broadest possible participation 
in the i nsurance program, the fede r al government subsidizes up to 30 
per cent of each producer's premium up through the 65 percent coverage 
l evel . The dollar amount subsidy to the 65 percent level is used in 
the 75 percent coverage level. 
1
This price election does not guarantee fa rmers a fixed price. They 
are only used to calculate indemnities if yields are below specified 
l evel s. Farmers who wish to also manage price risk have several op-
tions, e.g. price and income support programs, hedging, and forward 
contracting . 
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The FCIC may enter into agreements with any state or agency of a 
state under which such state or agency may pay to the FCIC additional 
premium subsidy to further reduce the portion of the premium paid by 
1 farmers in each state . 
Over the long run, premiums will be adjusted for all insured 
farmers in relation to their loss experience . Farmers with a loss 
ratio of less than one (ratio as indemnities paid to premiums) can 
achieve up to a 50 percent reduction in premiums over a 15-year period . 
Those with a l oss ratio above one will face an increasing premium . 
Premiums are fully tax deductible . They are used only to pay losses 
and reserves for catastrophic losses. They a re not used for administra-
tive expenses . 
Historical pay ou t as l osses for 1948-80 period was $1 . 09 of each 
premium dollar . The target pay out as losses is $.90 should be returned 
as losses throughout the years . 
Another aspect of the FCI is the insurance unit. In order to de-
fine the insurance policy unit, the FCIC has established the following 
· d. · i ·d 1. 2 unit 1v1s on gu1 e ines: 
(1) The insured maintains written verifiable records of planted 
acreage and harvested produc tion for the previous year. 
(2) The acreage planted to the insured crop is located in separate 
legal ly identifiable sections or, in the absence of section 
l 
Texas is the f irst state that has submitted a bill to provide 
such aid to the agricultural sect or . 
2Effective beginning with the 1983 crop year . 
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descriptions , the land is identifie d by separate ASCS farm 
serial numbers provided (a) the boundaries of the section 
or fann serial numbers are clearly identifiable and the in-
sured acreage determinable, (b) the crop is planted in such 
a manner that the planting pattern does not con tinue into 
the adjacent section of farm serial number. 
(3) The acreage planted to the insured crop is located in a 
single section or farm serial number and consists of ac r eage 
on which both an irrigated and non-irrigated practice is 
carried out provided (a) the crop planted on irrigated acr e-
age does not continue i n to non- irrigated acreage in the same 
rows and/or planting pattern, and (b) planting, fertilizing 
and harvesting are carried out according to recommended dry-
land and irrigated practices for the area. 
The purpose of the unit guidelines is to clearly identify the block 
of acreage on which indemnities are determined, i f losses occur . 
Indemnities 
An important issue is how loss adjustment will be handled . Farmer s 
should report loss to the agent from whom they purchase insurance as 
soon as a loss is apparent . They should not wait until loss is proven 
at harvest time . Losses are adjusted on a per unit basis . 
Loss measurement as reflected in yield reduction should be rela-
tively straightforward, though the question of whether a damaged crop 
should be harvested could occur. 
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Loss of quality is a new protection that has been included in the 
FCI coverages (i . e. excess moisture) . A recent statement by the FCIC 
concerning quality loss is as follows: 
The insured may suffer a loss in quality as well as a 
los s in quantity. A loss in quality will generally be re-
flected in the price at which the product can be sold on 
the market. There are a number of methods used, depending 
upon the commodity , to reflect this type of loss . Essen-
tially, these methods are to reduce the amotmt of damaged 
production t o be counted against the production guarantee, 
thus increasing the indemnity payable. 
It should be noted that quality and quantity losses are 
not settled separately but are combined . High production 
may offset some or even all of the loss from poor quality 
of production . Quality protection was not given in the 
early years of federal crop insurance, but was added as 
workable methods were developed. 
In any event, determination of indemnity involves dealing with an 
individual loss con tractor designated by and directly representing the 
FCIC . Private sales agents or insurance companies are not involved in 
evaluating losses in determining i ndemnities. 
Once the damage is determined , i . e. total number of bushels below 
the guarantee level, the indemnity is cal culated at the pre-selected 
price level specified in the contract . 
Crucial Dates 
Several final dates are established each yea r for the following 
purposes: 
" Sales Closing" is the last date that insurance can be purchased 
for each crop. 
" Final Planting" is the date at which planting must be completed. 
151 
- "Acreage Report" is the date by which a final planted acreage 
report must be submitted to FCIC. 
- "End of Insurance Period" is the final date at which harvest 
must be completed to qualify for indemnity if a loss is in-
curred. 
- "Termination of Indebtedness" is the final date at which premi-
ums must be paid . 
- "Cancellation" is the final date for cancellation of the con-
tract if a producer does not wish to continue the insurance 
the following year. 
Individual Plans 
Individual Yield Coverage Program 
Farmers who demonstrate yields significantly above those estab-
lis hed by FCIC inthe county where their farm belongs can arrange an 
Individual Yield Plan (IYP) with the FCIC. 
Three years' individual production records are required to be 
compared with county yield averages to arrive at a producer yield 
index. The farmer's index is determined by dividing the yields from 
the farmer ' s records by the USDA ' s Statistical Reporting Service (SRS) 
yie lds for those years. This index will be applied to the county 
average (as computed by the SRS) for up to seven additional years to 
determine the producer ' s individual yields . 
For purposes of illustration, asstnne that the farmer ' s most 
recent yields of corn are 120, 100 and 110 bushels per acre in the 
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last three years. Also assume that the SRS county records yield per 
acre for the same years are 80, 75 and 70. Thus, the produce r index 
is equal to the average fa rm records divided by the average of SRS 
records (Table A.l) . 
Table A. l . Examples of individual yield plan estimation 
Farmer ' s records 
yield per acre 
SRS county r ecords 
yield per acre 
Most recent year 
Second most recent year 
Third most recen t year 
Average 
Producer Index: 110 + 75 1.4 7 
Yield Calculation: 
Farmer ' s records (3 years) 
Seven years (no records) times 
70 bushels per acre times 
1. 4 7 index 720 
(720 + 120 + 100 + 110) 1050 + 10 
120 
100 
110 
110 
120 
100 
110 
80 
75 
70 
75 
SRS Yield used by FCIC for 
missing years of the ten-
year base period = 70 
-
105 bushels per acre --
As a result, this farmer can purchase insurance at 50 , 65, or 75 
percent of his actual weighted farm yield of 105 bushels per acre in-
s tead of the 75 bushels per acre of the SRS yield records . The yield 
5uarantee has increased, but the maxiwUlll protection is still 75 percent. 
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On the other hand, the premium rate as well as the total amount of 
p remium remain based upon a r ea average yield (75 bu/Ac in this case) 
according to a special provision of the Federal Crop I nsurance Act of 
1980. 
Individual Certif ied Yield Plan 
This program was designed mainly for farmers who feed their crop 
production to livestock or poultry and do not keep adequate production 
r ecords. 
Under the ICYP, farmers must produce satisfactory acreage and yield 
data for at least the most recent c r op year , plus any complete or incom-
plete data for that c rop for the previous two years . Crop yield data 
mus t be certified by ASCS . 
The remaining years of a ten-year base period will be calculated 
by adj ust ing the county average as computed by SRS . This will be done 
in the s ame manne r as for IYP. 
As soon as three conseecutive years of acreage and yield data are 
avai l able, the producers using the ICYP must convert to the IYP for 
determining yields . 
Under the ICYP, higher coverages require addit ional premiums per 
acre than under the IYP program. The ICYP program will apply to 1983 
spring planted corn, grain s orghum, barley , and oats, and only in 
certain counties. 
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Late Planting Agreement Option 
Farmers who are not able to meet FCIC ' s planting deadline will be 
able to purchase insuran ce protection . The coverage is extended on 
acreage planted up t o a maximum of 20 days after the final planting day . 
The production guarantee on the acreage will be red uced ten percent every 
five days up to the 20th day following the final planting date . The 
premium rate will remain the same for the coverage provided . 
An example 
The following example is given with the purpose of presenting a 
practical cal culation of a typical FCI . No attempt is made to cover all 
the details of insuran ce explained above . 
Data of FCI in O' Brien County, Iowa, had been selected fo r 1983 
and succeeding cr op years on insurance of corn . This crop is one of 
s ix insurable c rops in Iowa (others are barley, gr ain sorghum , oats, 
soybeans and wheat) . 
Table A. 2 contains different insurance options fo r each land 
classification . Corn producers can insure to cover a price of $2.00, 
$2 . 40 or $2 . 70 per bushel at three yield l eve l s and with or without 
hail and fire protection . I n O'Brien County, six land cl assifications 
are es t ablished to indicate aver age yield l evels on different quality 
land i n the county. These classes reflect average corn yield e xpecta-
tions from land cl assification cat egories 1 through 6 of 110, 86, 100, 
118 , 76 and 104 bushels per acre , respectively. 
Assume a farmer in O' Brien County wants to insure a unit of 80 
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acres under class ification 2 (Unit A) and a unit of 60 acres under 
classification 4 (Unit B), both of corn . 
In this case, the farmer has 18 different insurance options for 
each lan d unit . There are three aspects the producer has to decide on : 
the percentage of normal yield to be guar anteed, the price guarantee per 
bushel he would l ike to be paid if a loss occurs and whether to take 
hail and fire insurance pr otection with the FCIC. 
Now, assume the same farmer chooses to insure unit A at 75 percent 
of the area average (normal) yield and at a price of $2 . 70 per bushel 
and unit B at 65 pe r cent of the normal yield and at a price of $2 . 40 per 
bus hel . Also assume that ins urances policies for the units A and n in-
elude hail and fi r e p rotection. Total insurance cos t t o the fa rmer is 
as follows: 
Unit A 
(1) Number of Acres 80 
(2) Guaranteed pr oduction (64x80) = 5120 bu . 
(3) Subsidized insurance 
cost per acre $7.75 
(4) Total Cost Per Unit (lx3) $620.00 
(5) Total insurance cost to 
the farmer $896 . 00 
Unit B 
60 
(76x60) = 4560 bu. 
$4 . 60 
$276 . 00 
Suppose that fo r some insured causes , the farmer harvested only 
3,500 bushels in unit A and 3,700 bushels in unit B. Mor eover, the 
1,620 bushels lost in unit A include 1 , 000 bushels l ost for low yield 
per acre and 620 bushels lost because of loss in quality as estimated 
by the "loss contractor" of FCIC. 
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In spite of these facts, the producer's indemnity will be: 
(6) No. of bushels under 
guaranteed production level 
Unit A 
1,620 
(7) Guaran teed price pe r bushel $2.70 
(8) Total indemnity per unit 
(6x7) $4,374 . 00 
(9) Total indemnity to the 
farmer 
Unit B 
860 
$2.40 
$2,064.00 
$6,438.00 
Total return would amount to $6 , 438.00 plus the market value of 
7,200 bushels of corn that were harvested . 
If a crop is damaged to the extent that it is left unharvested, 
the indemnity payments are based on the total production guaranteed per 
unit (5,120 and 4,560 bushels in this example). The indemnity payment 
is reduced by whichever is the lesser of bushels per acre as a percent 
of the production guaranteed to offset the lack of harvesting costs . 
The reason for this is that premiums are formulated to cover the ·cost 
of production. Since no harvesting costs we re incurred in this case, 
they were actual costs of production. 
AAV 
AAY 
APIK 
ARP 
ASCS 
ASPIK 
CL 
CSF 
DF 
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APPENDIX B. CODES OF THE 38 INPUT VARIABLES 
OF THE COMPUTER MODEL 
Average Asset Value ($/Ac) 
Area Average Yield (bu/Ac) 
Percentage of Base Acreage in PIK (%) 
Percentage of Base Acreage in ARP (%) 
ASCS Yield Program (bu/Ac) 
Percentage of ASCS Yield to be Paid (%) 
Cove r age Yield Level (%) 
Per centage of Actual Producti on (Yield (I) + PIK) to be Sold 
at Harvest Time (%) 
Discount Factor (Annual Rate) 
DPR = Diversion Payment Rate ($/bu) 
EY Expected Yield (bu/Ac) 
FB(I) Fall Basis (c/bu.) 
FC Fixed Production Cost ($/Ac) 
FFP(I) Fall Futures Prices ($/bu) 
FTP Federal Tax Paid Last Year ($) 
HC Harvest Cost ($/bu) 
IR Capital Interest Rate (x/100) 
IYP Individ ual Yield Plan (bu/Ac) 
LDP Percentage of Base Acreage in Land Diversion Program (%) 
LE Leverage Level (0 ~ LE ~ X) 
LO Land Operated (Ac) 
LR Loan Rate ($/bu) 
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L%R Loan Interest Rate ($/100) 
MC Maintenance Cost Per Unplanted Acre ($/Ac) 
OH Percentage of Yield (I) + PIK in Post-Harvest Hedge 
PH Percentage of EY to Hedge b/Harvest (%) 
PHFP = December Futures Prices at Harvest Time ($/bu) 
PL Price Coverage Level ($/bu) 
POFP = July Futures Prices at Harvest Time ($/bu) 
PR = Insurance Premium Rate (% of CL) 
PRR = Principal Retirement Rate (%) 
SB(I) = Summer Basis (c/bu) 
SC = Storage Cost Per Month (C/bu) 
SFP(I) = Summer Futures Prices ($/bu) 
TAI = Total Acres Insured (Ac) 
TP Target Price ($/bu) 
VC Variable Production Costs ($/Ac) 
YIEI.D(I) = Yield per planted acre 
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APPENDIX C. TRANSFORMATION Fln~CTIONS OF YIELD DATA 
The purpos e of this appendix is to facilitate the understanding 
of Hancock farm and Sutherland farm yield data analysis. 
Hancock Farm 
The residuals of the detrended observations are plotted in Figure 
C. l . They spread out rather than show a constant variance. To bring 
cone- shape residuals to parallel-lines residuals (constant variance), 
the regression equation Y = f(T) was divided by (6+0.2T). The value 
t 
of 6 is equal to two times the coefficient of T in the regression . 
Thus , (6+0 . 2T) will keep the residuals within a band of -6 and 6 and , 
in this way , the variance had been brought to a constant . 
The transformed expression is, 
~ 
Y* 
t 6+0.2T 
1 T = 57 .557 (G+0. 2T) + 2.897 (-6+- 0- .-2-T) (C.l) 
The residuals of the f unction in equation C. l are assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance a 2 (0.795 i n this case) . 
However, by plotting the "estimated" residuals 
Yt yt 
(6+0.2T - 6+0.2T) 
against those from a normal - N(0,.795), small discrepancies were found 
that needed correction. The corrections were obtained f rom the follow-
ing functions: 
Correction 
function 
-0.12 
Cumulative 
probability (P) 
0.10 ~ p 5 0.30 
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Correction Cumulative 
function Erobability (P) 
-0 . 12 + 56 (P-0.3)
2 
0.30 ~ p ~ 0.35 
+0 . 16 - 56 (P-0.4)
2 o. 35 ~ p s. 0.4 
+0.16 0.40 :::'. p ~ 0 . 75 
+0.16 - 13 (P-0.75 ) 2 0 . 75 < p 
where P i s a randomly generated uniform deviate (OS PS 1). For 
instance, when Pis between 0.40 and 0.75, the correc tion is equal to 
+0.16 . Thus, generating a sufficient number of uniform deviates, 
we ge t a transformed Hancock CDF derived from a normal CDF, which is 
correct ed by (1) a uni fo rm deviate, and (2) a correction function. 
Finally , since the norma l CDF is centered at a mean equal to 0, the 
mean of 1982 Hancock yield (! = 142 bu/Ac) is added to bring the 
t 
transformed CDF at present yield values . 
Sutherland Farm 
In the t ext of Chapter III, we have said that the Sutherland 
cumulative yield distribution sample has been generated f rom two .normal 
distributions: 
2 2 
N(7 , (19) ) and N9- 63 , (23) ) . Thus, the generating 
process is as follows : 
Step 1 . Generate a uniform deviate between 0 and 1. This deviate is 
called Z. 
Step 2. If Z S .9, then generate a normal deviate (X) with mean 7 and 
variance (19) 2 . (Go t o step 4). 
Step 3. If Z > .9, then generate a norma l deviate (X) with mean -63 
. 2 
and variance (23) . 
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Step 4. Add the normal deviate (X) to the mean of the Sutherland 
yield series (110.42 bu/Ac i n this case) . 1 This is, 
Step 5. 
Step 6. 
where: Y 
s 
Ys = X + 110.42 
yield sample. 
Calculate the cumulative probability at Y . 
s 
Return to step (1) and stop after 100 iterations. 
1 . 
This is done with the purpose of bringing the center of the 
distribution from 0 to actual yields. 
